Competitive Policy Optimization by Prajapat, Manish et al.
Competitive Policy Optimization
Manish Prajapat1, Kamyar Azizzadenesheli2, Alexander Liniger1,
Yisong Yue2, Anima Anandkumar2
1 ETH Zürich
2 California Institute of Technology
Abstract
A core challenge in policy optimization in competitive Markov decision processes is the
design of efficient optimization methods with desirable convergence and stability properties.
To tackle this, we propose competitive policy optimization (CoPO), a novel policy gradient
approach that exploits the game-theoretic nature of competitive games to derive policy updates.
Motivated by the competitive gradient optimization method, we derive a bilinear approximation
of the game objective. In contrast, off-the-shelf policy gradient methods utilize only linear
approximations, and hence do not capture interactions among the players. We instantiate
CoPO in two ways: (i) competitive policy gradient, and (ii) trust-region competitive policy
optimization. We theoretically study these methods, and empirically investigate their behavior
on a set of comprehensive, yet challenging, competitive games. We observe that they provide
stable optimization, convergence to sophisticated strategies, and higher scores when played
against baseline policy gradient methods.
1 Introduction
Reinforcement learning (RL) in competitive Markov decision process CoMDP [Filar and Vrieze,
2012] is the study of competitive players, sequentially making decisions in an environment [Puterman,
2014, Sutton and Barto, 2018]. In CoMDPs, the competing agents (players) interact with each
other within the environment, and through their interactions, learn how to develop their behavior
and improve their notion of reward. In this paper, we considered the rich and fundamental class
of zero-sum two-player games. Applications of such games abound from hypothesis testing [Wald,
1945], generative adversarial networks [Goodfellow et al., 2014], Lagrangian optimization [Dantzig,
1998], online learning [Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006], algorithmic game theory [Roughgarden, 2010],
robust control [Zhou et al., 1996], to board games [Tesauro, 1995, Silver et al., 2016].
In these applications, two players compete against each other, potentially in unknown environ-
ments. One goal is to learn policies/strategies for agents by making them play against each other.
Due to the competitive nature of games, RL methods that do not account for the interactions are
often susceptible to poor performance and divergence even in simple scenarios. One of the core
challenges in such settings is to design optimization paradigms with desirable convergence and
stability properties.
Policy gradient (PG) is a prominent RL approach that directly optimizes for policies, and enjoys
simplicity in implementation and deployment [Robbins and Monro, 1951, Aleksandrov et al., 1968,
Sutton et al., 2000]. PG updates are derived by optimizing the first order (linear) approximation
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of the objective function while regularizing the parameter deviations. In two-player zero-sum
CoMDPs, policy updates of the maximizing (minimizing) agent are derived through maximizing
(resp. minimizing) the linear approximation of the game objective with an additive (subtractive)
regularization, resulting in the gradient descent ascent (GDA) PG algorithm. This approximation
is linear in agents’ parameters and does not take their interaction into account. Therefore, GDA
directly optimizes the policy of each agent by assuming the policy/strategy of the opponent is not
updated, which can be a poor approach for competitive optimization.
We propose a new paradigm known as competitive policy optimization (CoPO), which exploits the
game-theoretic and competitive nature of CoMDPs, and, instead, inspired by competitive gradient
descent [Schäfer and Anandkumar, 2019], deploys a bilinear approximation of the game objective.
The bilinear approximation is separately linear in each agent’s parameters and is built on agents’
interactions to derive the policy updates. To compute the policy updates, CoPO computes the Nash
equilibrium of the bilinear approximation of the game objective with a (e.g., `2) regularization of the
parameter deviations. In CoPO, each agent derives its update with the full consideration of what
the other agent’s current move and moves in the future time steps might be. Importantly, each agent
considers how the environment, as the results of the agents’ current and future moves temporally,
evolves in favor of each agent. Therefore, each agent hypothesizes about what the other agent’s and
the environment’s responses would be, consequently resulting in the common recursive reasoning in
game theory, especially temporal recursion in CoMDPs. We further show that CoPO is a generic
approach that does not rely on the structure of the problem, at the cost of high sample complexity.
We instantiate CoPO in two ways to arrive at practical algorithms. We propose competitive
policy gradient (CoPG), a novel PG algorithm that exploit value functions and structure of CoMDPs
to efficiently obtain policy updates. We also propose trust region competitive policy optimization
(TRCoPO), a novel trust region based PG method [Kakade and Langford, 2002, Schulman et al.,
2015]. TRCoPO optimizes a surrogate game objective in a trust region. TRCoPO updates agents’
parameters simultaneously by deriving the Nash equilibrium of bilinear (in contrast to linear
approximation in off-the-shelf trust region methods) approximation to the surrogate objective within
a defined trust region in the parameter space.
We empirically study the performance of CoPG and TRCoPO on six representative games,
ranging from single-state to general sequential games, and tabular to infinite/continuous states/action
games. We observe that CoPG and TRCoPO not only provide more stable and faster optimization,
but also converge to more sophisticated, opponent aware, and competitive strategies compared with
their conventional counterparts, GDA and TRGDA. When trained agents play against each other,
we observe the superiority of CoPG and TRCoPO agents, e.g., in the Markov soccer game, CoPG
agent beats GDA in 74%, and TRCoPO agent beats TRGDA in 85% of the matches. We observe a
similar trend with other methods, such as multi-agent deep deterministic PG (MADDPG) [Lowe
et al., 2017].
A related approach that uses a second-level reasoning (as opposed to CoPO with infinite-level
reasoning) is LOLA [Foerster et al., 2017a], which shows positive results on three games, matching
pennies, prisoners’ dilemma and a coin game. We compare LOLA against CoPG and TRCoPO
and observe a similar trend in the superiority of CoPO based methods. We conclude the paper by
arguing the generality of CoPO paradigm, and how it can be used to generalize single-agent PG
methods to CoMDPs.
2
2 Preliminaries
A two player CoMDP is a tuple of 〈S,A1,A2,R, T ,P, γ〉, where S is the state space, s ∈ S is a
state, for player i ∈ {1, 2}, Ai is the player i’s action space with ai ∈ Ai. R is the reward kernel
with probability distribution R(·|s, a1, a2) and mean function r(s, a1, a2) on R. For a probability
measure P, p denotes the probability distribution of initial state, and for the transition kernel T ,
T (s′|s, a1, a2) is the distribution of successive state s′ after taking actions a1, a2 simultaneously at
state s, with discount factor γ ∈ [0, 1]. We consider episodic environments with reachable absorbing
state sT almost surely in finite time. An episode starts at s0 ∼ p, and at each time step k ≥ 0 at
state sk, each player i draws its action aik according to policy π(a
i
k|sk; θi) parameterized by θi ∈ Θi,
where Θi ⊂ Rl is a compact metric space. Players 1, 2 receive (rk,−rk) with rk ∼ R(sk, a1k, a2k), and
the environment evolves to a new state sk+1. A realization of this stochastic process is a trajectory
τ =
(
(sk, a
1
k, a
2
k, rk)
|τ |−1
k=0 , s|τ |
)
, an ordered sequence with random length |τ |, where |τ | is determined
by episode termination time and state s|τ | = sT . Let f(τ ; θ1, θ2) denote the probability distribution
of the trajectory τ following players’ policies π(θi),
f(τ ; θ1, θ2) = p(s0)
|τ |−1∏
k=0
π(a1k|sk; θ1)π(a2k|sk; θ2)R(rk|sk, a1k, a2k)T (sk+1|sk, a1k, a2k). (1)
For R(τ) =
∑|τ |
k=0 γ
kr(sk, a
1
k, a
2
k), the Q-function, V -functions, and game objective are defined,
Q(sk, a
1
k, a
2
k; θ
1, θ2) = Eτ∼f(·;θ1,θ2)
[∑|τ |−1
j=k
γj−kr(sj , a
1
j , a
2
j )|sk, a1k, a2k
]
, (2)
V (sk; θ
1, θ2) = Eτ∼f(·;θ1,θ2)
[∑|τ |−1
j=k
γj−kr(sj , a
1
j , a
2
j )|sk
]
, η(θ1, θ2) =
∫
τ
f(τ ; θ1, θ2)R(τ)dτ
We assume V , Q, and η are differentiable and bounded in (Θ1,Θ2) and for f on (Θ1 Θ2), Dθif =
∂
∂θ′i
f(θ′1,θ′2)
∣∣
(θ′1,θ′2)=(θ1,θ2)
, and Dθiθjf = ∂∂θ′i
(
∂
∂θ′j
f(θ′1,θ′2)
)∣∣
(θ′1,θ′2)=(θ1,θ2)
, for i, j ∈ {1, 2}.
3 Competitive Policy Optimization
Player 1 aims to maximize the game objective η Eq. (2), while player 2 aims to minimize it, i.e.,
simultaneously solving for maxθ1 η(θ1, θ2) and minθ2 η(θ1, θ2) respectively with,
θ1∗ ∈ arg maxθ1∈Θ1 η(θ1, θ2), and θ2∗ ∈ arg minθ2∈Θ2 η(θ1, θ2). (3)
As discussed in the introduction, a straightforward generalization of PG methods to CoMDP,
results in GDA (Alg.1). Given players’ parameters (θ1, θ2), GDA prescribes to optimize a linear
approximation of the game objective in the presence of a regularization for the policy updates,
θ1←θ1+ arg max
∆θ:∆θ+θ∈Θ1
∆θ>Dθ1η −
1
2α
||∆θ||2, and θ2 ← θ2+ arg min
∆θ:∆θ+θ∈Θ2
∆θ>Dθ2η +
1
2α
||∆θ||2, (4)
where α represent the step size. The parameter updates in Eq. 4 result in greedy updates along the
directions of maximum change, assuming the other player stays constant. These updates are myopic,
and ignore the agents’ interactions. In other words, player 1 does not take player’s 2 potential move
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into consideration and vice versa. While GDA might be an approach of interest in decentralized
CoMDP, it mainly falls short in the problem of competitive and centralized optimization in unknown
CoMDPs, i.e., the focus of this work. In fact, this behaviour is far from optimal and is shown to
diverge in many simple cases e.g. plain bilinear or linear quadratic games [Schäfer and Anandkumar,
2019, Mazumdar et al., 2019].
We propose competitive policy optimization CoPO, a policy gradient approach for optimization
in unknown CoMDPs. In contrast to standard PG methods, such as GDA, CoPO considers a bilinear
approximation of the game objective, and takes the interaction between players into account. CoPO
incorporates the game theoretic nature of the CoMDP optimization and derives parameter updates
through finding the Nash equilibrium of the bilinear approximation of the game objective,
θ1 ← θ1 + arg max∆θ1:∆θ1+θ1∈Θ1 ∆θ1
>
Dθ1η + ∆θ
1>Dθ1θ2η∆θ
2 − 1
2α
||∆θ1||2,
θ2 ← θ2 + arg min∆θ2:∆θ2+θ2∈Θ2 ∆θ2
>
Dθ2η + ∆θ
2>Dθ2θ1η∆θ
1 +
1
2α
||∆θ2||2, (5)
which has an extra term, the interaction term, in contrast to Eq. 4, and has the following closed-form
solution,
θ1 ← θ1 + α
(
I + α2Dθ1θ2ηDθ2θ1η
)−1(
Dθ1η − αDθ1θ2ηDθ2η
)
,
θ2 ← θ2 − α
(
I + α2Dθ2θ1ηDθ1θ2η
)−1(
Dθ2η + αDθ2θ1ηDθ1η
)
, (6)
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Figure 1: Bilinear games: (a) CoPO updates
towards Nash equilibrium. (b) GDA updates
point outward, leading to cycling/divergence.
where I is an identity matrix of appropriate size. Note
that, the bilinear approximation in Eq. 5 is still linear
in each player’s action/parameters. Including any
other terms, e.g., block diagonal Hessian terms from
the Taylor expansion of the game objective, results
in nonlinear terms in at least one player’s parameters.
As such, CoPO can be viewed as a natural linear
generalization of PG. It is known that GDA-style
co-learning approaches can often diverge or cycle
indefinitely and never converge [Mertikopoulos et al.,
2018a]. Fig. 1 shows that for a bilinear game, the
gradient flow of GDA cycles or has gradient flow
outward, while the CoPG flow, considering players’
future moves, has gradient flow toward the Nash equilibrium and converges. In Apx.B, we deploy
the Neumann series expansion of the inverses in Eq.5, and show that CoPO recovers the infinite
recursion reasoning between players and the environment, while GDA correspond to the first term,
and LOLA corresponds to the first two terms in the series. Next, we compute terms in Eq. 6 using
the score function g(τ, θi) := Dθi(log
∏|τ |−1
k=0 π(ak|sk; θ
i)),
Proposition 1. Given a CoMDP, players i, j ∈{1, 2}, i 6= j and the policy parameters θi, θj,
Dθiη =
∫
τ
f(τ ; θ1, θ2)g(τ, θi)R(τ)dτ, and Dθiθjη=
∫
τ
f(τ ; θ1, θ2)g(τ, θi)g(τ, θj)>R(τ)dτ.
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Proof in Apx. C.1. In practice, we use conjugate gradient and Hessian vector product to efficiently
compute the updates in Eq.6, as explained in later sections. A closer look at CoPO shows that this
paradigm does not require the knowledge of the environment if sampled trajectories are available. It
neither requires full observability of the sates, nor any structural assumption on CoMDP, but the
Monte Carlo estimation suffer from high variance. In the following, we explicitly take the CoMDP
structure into account to develop efficient algorithms.
3.1 Competitive Policy Gradient
We propose competitive policy gradient (CoPG), an efficient algorithm that exploits the structure of
CoMDPs to compute the parameter updates. The following is the CoMDP generalizing of the single
agent PG theorem [Sutton et al., 2000]. For τl:l′ = (sk, a1k, a
2
k, rk)
l′
k=l, the events from time step l to
l′, we have:
Theorem 1. Given a CoMDP, players i, j ∈{1, 2}, i 6= j, and the policy parameters θi, θj,
Dθiη =
∫
τ
|τ |−1∑
k=0
γkf(τ0:k; θ
1, θ2)Dθi(log π(a
i
k|sk; θi))Q(sk, a1k, a2k; θ1, θ2)dτ, (7)
Dθiθjη =(1̂):
∫
τ
|τ |−1∑
k=0
γkf(τ0:k; θ
1, θ2)Dθi(log π(a
i
k|sk; θi))Dθj (log π(a
j
k|sk; θ
j))>Q(sk, a
1
k, a
2
k; θ
1, θ2)dτ
+(2̂) :
∫
τ
|τ |−1∑
k=1
γkf(τ0:k; θ
1,θ2)Dθi(log
k−1∏
l=0
π(ail|sl; θi))Dθj (log π(a
j
k|sk; θ
j))>Q(sk, a
1
k, a
2
k; θ
1, θ2)dτ
+(3̂):
∫
τ
|τ |−1∑
k=1
γkf(τ0:k; θ
1,θ2)Dθi(log π(a
i
k|sk; θi))Dθj (log
k−1∏
l=0
π(ajl |sl; θ
j))>Q(sk, a
1
k, a
2
k; θ
1, θ2)dτ. (8)
Proof in Apx. C.2. This theorem indicates that the terms in Eq. 6 can be computed using Q
function. In Eq. 8, (1̂) is the immediate interaction between players, (2̂) is the interaction of player
i’s behavior up to time step k with player j’s reaction at time step k, and the environment. (3̂) is
the interaction of player j’s behavior upto time step k with player i’s reaction at time step k, and
the environment.
CoPG operates in epochs. At each epoch, CoPG deploys π(θ1), π(θ2) to collect trajectories,
exploits them to estimate the Q, Dθiη, and Dθiθjη. Then CoPG follows the parameter updates
in Eq. 6 and updates (θ1, θ2), and this process goes on to the next epoch (Alg.2). Many variants
of PG approach uses baselines, and replace Q with, the advantage function A(s, a1, a2; θ1, θ2) =
Q(s, a1, a2; θ1, θ2)− V (s; θ1, θ2), Monte Carlo estimate of Q-V [Baird, 1993], empirical TD error or
generalized advantage function (GAE) [Schulman et al., 2016]. Our algorithm can be extended to
this set up and in Apx. D we show how CoPG can be accompanied with all the mentioned variants.
3.2 Trust Region Competitive Policy Optimization
Trust region based policy optimization methods exploit the local Riemannian geometry of the
parameter space to derive more efficient policy updates [Kakade and Langford, 2002, Kakade, 2002,
Schulman et al., 2015]. In this section, we propose trust region competitive policy optimization
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(TRCoPO), the CoPO generalization of TRPO [Schulman et al., 2015], that exploits the local
geometry of the competitive objective to derive more efficient parameter updates.
Lemma 1. Given the advantage function of policies π(θ1), π(θ2), ∀(θ′1, θ′2) ∈ Θ1 ×Θ2 we have,
η(θ′1, θ′2) = η(θ1, θ2) + Eτ∼f(·;θ′1,θ′2)
∑|τ |−1
k=0
γkA(s, a1, a2; θ1, θ2). (9)
Proof in Apx. F.1. Eq.9 indicates that, considering our current policies (π(θ1), π(θ1)), having
access to their advantage function, and also samples from f(·; θ′1, θ′2) of any (θ′1, θ′2) (without
rewards), we can directly compute η(θ′1, θ′2) and optimize for (θ′1, θ′2). However, in practice, we
might not have access to f(·; θ′1, θ′2) for all (θ′1, θ′2) to accomplish the optimization task, therefore,
direct use of Eq.9 is not favorable. Instead, we define a surrogate objective function, Lθ1,θ2(θ′1, θ′2),
Lθ1,θ2(θ
′1, θ′2)=η(θ1, θ2)+Eτ∼f(·;θ1,θ2)
|τ |−1∑
k=0
γkEπ(a′1k |sk;θ′1),π(a′2k |sk;θ′2)A(sk, a
′1
k , a
′2
k ; θ
1, θ2), (10)
which can be computed using trajectories of our current polices π(θ1), π(θ2). Lθ1,θ2(θ′
1, θ′2) is
an object of interest in PG [Kakade and Langford, 2002, Schulman et al., 2015] since mainly its
gradient is equal to that of η(θ1, θ2) at (θ1, θ2), and as stated in the following theorem, it can
carefully be used as a surrogate of the game value. For KL divergence DKL((θ1, θ2), (θ′1, θ′2)) :=∫
τ f(τ, θ
1, θ2) log
(
f(τ, θ1, θ2)/f(τ, θ′1, θ′2)
)
dτ , we have,
Theorem 2. Lθ1,θ2(θ′
1, θ′2) approximate η(θ′1, θ′2) up to the following error upper bound
|η(θ′1, θ′2)− Lθ1θ2(θ′1, θ′2)| ≤ ε/
√
2
√
DKL((θ′1, θ′2), (θ1, θ2)), (11)
with constant ε := maxτ
∑|τ |
k γ
kEπ(a′1k |sk;θ′1),π(a′2k |sk;θ′2)A(sk, a
′1
k , a
′2
k ; θ
1, θ2).
Proof in Apx. F.2. This theorem states that we can use Lθ1θ2(θ′1, θ′2) to optimize for η(θ′1, θ′2) as
long as we keep the (θ′1, θ′2) in the vicinity of θ1, θ2. Similar to single agent TRPO [Schulman et al.,
2015], we optimize for Lθ1θ2(θ′1, θ′2), while constraining the KL divergence, DKL((θ1, θ2), (θ′1, θ′2)) ≤
δ′, i.e.,
maxθ′1∈Θ1 minθ′2Θ1 Lθ1θ2(θ
′1, θ′2), subject to: DKL((θ1, θ2), (θ′1, θ′2)) ≤ δ′. (12)
The GDA generalizing of TRPO uses a linear approximation of Lθ1θ2(θ′1, θ′2) to approach this
optimization, which again ignores the players’ interactions. In contrast, TRCoPO considers the
game theoretic nature of this optimization, and uses a bilinear approximation. TRCoPO operates
in epochs. At each epoch, TRCoPO deploys (π(θ1), π(θ2)) to collect trajectories, exploits them to
estimate A (or GAE), then updates parameters accordingly, Alg.4. (For more details, please refer to
Apx. F.3.)
4 Experiments
We empirically study the performance of CoPG and TRCoPO and their counterparts GDA and
TRGDA, on six games, ranging from single-state repeated games to general sequential games, and
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tabular games to infinite/continuous states/action games. They are 1) linear-quadratic(LQ) game,
2) bilinear game, 3) matching pennies (MP), 4) rock paper scissors (RPS), 5) Markov soccer, and 6)
car racing. These games are representative enough that their study provides insightful conclusions,
and challenging enough to highlight the core difficulties and interactions in competitive games.
We show that CoPG and TRCoPO converge to stable points, and learn opponent aware strategies,
whereas GDA’s and TRGDA’s greedy approach shows poor performance and even diverge in bi-linear,
MP, and RPS games. For the LQ game, when GDA does not diverge, it almost requires 1.5 times
the amount of samples, and is 1.5 times slower than CoPG. In highly strategic games, where
players’ policies are tightly coupled, we show that CoPG and TRCoPO learn much better interactive
strategies. In the soccer game, CoPG and TRCoPO players learn to defend, dodge and score goals,
whereas GDA and TRGDA players learn how to score when they are initialized with the ball, and
give way to the other player otherwise. In the car racing, while GDA and TRGDA show poor
performance, CoPG and TRCoPO produce competing players, which learn to block and fake each
other. Overall, we observe CoPG and TRCoPO considerably outperform their counterparts in terms
of convergence, learned strategies, and gradient dynamics. Note that in self-play, one player plays
against itself using one policy model (neural network) for both players, is a special case of CoPO
and we provide its detailed study in Apx. E.
We implemented all algorithms in Pytorch [Paszke et al., 2019], and made the code and the videos
public1. In our implementation, we deploy Pytorch’s autograd package and Hessian vector product
to efficiently obtain gradients and Hessian vector products to compute the bilinear terms in the
optimizer. Moreover, we use the conjugate gradient trick to efficiently computed the inverses-matrix
vector product in Eq.6 which incurs a minimal computational overhead (see [Shewchuk, 1994] for
more details). To improve computation times, we compute inverse-matrix vector product only for one
player strategy, and use optimal counter strategy for other player ∆θ2 which is computed without
an inverse matrix vector product. Also, the last optimal strategy can be used to warm start the
conjugate gradient method which improves convergence times. We provide efficient implementation
for both CoPO- and GDA-based methods, where CoPO incurs 1.5 times extra computation per
batch.
Zero-sum LQ game is a continuous state-action linear dynamical game between two players,
where GDA, with considerably small learning rate, has favorable convergence guarantees [Zhang
et al., 2019]. This makes the LQ game an ideal platform to study the range of allowable step sizes and
convergence rate of CoPG and GDA. We show that, with increasing learning rate, GDA generates
erratic trajectories and policy updates, which cause instability (see “” in Tab. 2), whereas CoPG is
robust towards this behavior. Fig. 2a shows that CoPG dynamics are not just faster at the same
learning rate but more importantly, CoPG can potentially take even larger steps.
Bilinear game is a state-less strongly non-cooperative game, where GDA is known to di-
verge [Balduzzi et al., 2018]. In this game, reward r(a1, a2) = 〈a1, a2〉 where a1 ∼ N (µ1, σ1) and
a2 ∼ N (µ2, σ2), and (µ1, σ1), (µ2, σ2) are policy parameters. We show that GDA diverges for all
learning rates, whereas CoPG converges to the unique Nash equilibrium Fig. 2b.
Matching pennies and Rock paper scissors, are challenging matrix games with mixed
strategies as Nash equilibria, demand opponent aware optimization.2 We show that CoPG and
TRCoPO both converge to the unique Nash equilibrium of MP Fig. 2c and RPS Fig. 2d, whereas
1Videos are available here: https://sites.google.com/view/rl-copo
2Traditionally, fictitious and counterfactual regret minimization approaches have been deployed [Neller and Lanctot,
2013].
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Figure 2: During training CoPG (C) vs GDA (G) on a) LQ game, difference in game objective due
to policy update for α = 1e− 1, 1e− 2 b) Bilinear game, µ1 vs µ2 c) MP, probability of selecting
Head(H) and Tail(T) d) RPS, probability of selecting rock(R), paper(P) and scissors(S).
GDA and TRGDA diverges (to a sequence of polices that are exploitable by deterministic strategy).
Detailed empirical study, formulation and explanation of these four games can be found in Apx. H.
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Figure 3: a-c), e-g) Interaction plots, representing probability of seizing ball in the game between A
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A
B
Goal Ball
Figure 4: Markov Soccer
Markov soccer game, Fig. 4, consists of players A and B that
are randomly initialised in the field, that are supposed to pick up
the ball and put it in the opponent’s goal [Littman, 1994, He et al.,
2016]. The winner is awarded with +1 and the loser with -1 (see
Apx. H.5 for more details). Since all methods converge in this game,
it is a suitable game to compare learned strategies. In this game,
we expect a reasonable player to learn sophisticated strategies of
defending, dodging and scoring. For each method playing against
their counterparts, e.g., CoPG against CoPG and GDA, Fig. 3 shows
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the number of times the ball is seized between the players before one
player finally scores a goal, or time-out. In (3a), CoPG vs CoPG, we see agents seize ball, twice the
times as compared to (3b),GDA vs GDA (see A2 and B2 in (3a) and (3b)). In the matches CoPG
vs GDA (3c), CoPG trained agent could seize the ball from GDA agent (A2) nearly 12 times more
due to better seizing and defending strategy, but GDA can hardly take the ball back from CoPG
(B2) due to a better dodging strategy of the CoPG agent. Playing CoPG agent against GDA one,
we observe that CoPG wins more than 74% of the games Fig. 3d. We observe a similar trend for
trust region based methods TRCoPO and TRGDA, playing against each other (a slightly stronger
results of 85% wins, A2 column in Figs 3g, 3c).
We also compared CoPG with MADDPG [Lowe et al., 2017] and LOLA [Foerster et al., 2017a].
We observe that the MADDPG learned policy behaves similar to GDA, and loses 80% of the games
to CoPG’s (Fig. 14b). LOLA learned policy, with its second level reasoning, performs better than
GDA, but lose to CoPG 72% of the matches. For completeness, we also compared GDA-PG, CoPG,
TRGDA, and TRCoPO playing against each other. TRCoPO performs best,CoPG was runner up,
then TRGDA, and lastly GDA (see Apx. H.5).
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Figure 5: Normalised progress of agents in one lap of car racing game during training
Car Racing is another interesting game, with continuous state-action space, where two race
cars competing against each other to finish the race first Liniger and Lygeros [2020]. The game is
accompanied by two important challenges, 1) learning a policy that can maneuver the car at the
limit of handling, 2) strategic interactions with opponents. The track is challenging, consisting of
13 turns with different curvature (Fig. 13). The game is formulated as a zero-sum, with reward
r(sk, a
1
k, a
2
k) = ∆ρcar1 −∆ρcar2 , where ∆ρ = ρk+1 − ρk and ρk is the car’s progress along the track
at the kth time step. If a car crosses track boundaries (e.g., hit the wall), it is penalized, and the
opponent receives rewards, this encourages cars to play rough and push each other into the track
boundaries. When a collision happens, the rear car is penalized, and the car in the front receives a
reward; it promotes blocking by the car in front and overtaking by the car in the rear.
We study agents trained with all GDA, TRGDA, MADDPG, LOLA, CoPG and TRCoPO in this
game, and show that even though all players were able to learn to "drive" only CoPG and TRCoPO
were able to learn how to "race". Using GDA, only one player was able to learn, which manifested in
either one player completely failing and the other finishing the track (Fig. 5a), or by an oscillation
behavior where one player learns to go ahead, the other agent stays at lower progress(Fig. 5c, Fig. 5e).
Even if one of the players learns to finish one lap at some point, this player does not learn to interact
with its opponent(https://youtu.be/rxkGW02GwvE). In contrast, players trained with CoPG and
TRGDA, both progress, learn to finish the lap, and race (interact with each other) (See Fig. 5b and
Fig. 5d). To test the policies, we performed races between CoPG and GDA, TRCoPO and TRGDA,
and CoPG and TRCoPO. As shown in Tab. 1, CoPG and TRCoPO win almost all races against
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their counterparts. Overall, we see that both CoPG and TRCoPO are able to learn policies that are
faster, more precise, and interactive with the other player (e.g., learns to overtake).
Table 1: Normalized score computed based on 10000 races in the car racing game
CoPG vs GDA TRCoPO vs TRGDA CoPG vs TRCoPO
Wins 1 0 1 0 0.24 0.76
Overtake 1.28 0.78 1.28 0.78 1.80 2.07
Collision 0.17 16.11 0.25 1.87 0.30 0.31
5 Related Work
In tabular CoMDP, Q-learning and actor-critic have been deployed [Littman, 1994, 2001b,a, Green-
wald and Hall, 2003, Hu and Wellman, 2003, Grau-Moya et al., 2018, Frénay and Saerens, 2009,
Pérolat et al., 2018, Srinivasan et al., 2018], and recently, deep RL methods have been extending
to CoMDPs, with focus of modeling agents behaviour [Tampuu et al., 2015, Leibo et al., 2017,
Raghu et al., 2017]. To mitigate the stabilization issues, centralized methods [Matignon et al., 2012,
Lowe et al., 2017, Foerster et al., 2017b], along with opponent’s behavior modeling [Raileanu et al.,
2018, He et al., 2016] have been explored. Optimization in multi-agent learning can be interpreted
as a game in the parameter space, and the main body of the mentioned literature does not take
this aspect directly into account since they attempt to separately improve players’ performance.
Hence, they often fail to achieve desirable performance and oftentimes suffer from unstable training,
especially in strategic games [Hernandez-Leal et al., 2019, Buşoniu and Babuška, 2010]. In imperfect
information games with known rules, e.g., poker [Moravcík et al., 2017], a series of works study
algorithmically computing Nash equilibra [Shalev-shwartz and Singer, 2007, Koller et al., 1995, Gilpin
et al., 2007, Zinkevich et al., 2008, Bowling et al., 2017]. Also, studies in stateless episodic games
shown convergence to coarse correlated equilibrium [Hartline et al., 2015, Blum et al., 2008]. In
contrast CoPO converges to the Nash equilibrium in such games. In two-player competitive games,
self-play is an approach of interest where a player plays against itself to improve its behavior [Tesauro,
1995, Silver et al., 2016]. But, many of these approaches are limited to specific domains [Heinrich
et al., 2015, Heinrich and Silver, 2016].
The closest approach to CoPO in the literature is LOLA [Foerster et al., 2017a] an opponent
aware approach. LOLA updates parameters using a second-order correction term, resulting in
gradient updates corresponding to the following shortened recursion: if a player thinks that the
other player thinks its strategy stays constant [Schäfer and Anandkumar, 2019], whereas CoPO
recovers the full recursion series until the Nash equilibrium is delivered. In contrast to [Foerster
et al., 2017a] we also provide CoPO extension to value-based, and trust region-based methods, along
with their efficient implementation.
Our work is also related to GANs [Goodfellow et al., 2014], which involves solving a zero
sum two-player competitive game (CoMDP with single state). Recent development in nonconvex-
nonconcave problems and GANs training show, simple and intuitive, GDA has undesirable convergence
properties [Mazumdar et al., 2019] and exhibit strong rotation around fixed points [Balduzzi et al.,
2018]. To overcome this rotation behaviour of GDA, various modifications have been proposed,
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including averaging [Yazıcı et al., 2018], negative momentum [Gidel et al., 2018] along many others
[Mertikopoulos et al., 2018b, Daskalakis et al., 2017, Mescheder et al., 2017, Balduzzi et al., 2018,
Gemp and Mahadevan, 2018]. Considering the game-theoretic nature of this problem, competitive
gradient descent has been proposed as a natural generalization of gradient descent in two-players
instead of GDA for GANs [Schäfer and Anandkumar, 2019]. This method, as the predecessor to
CoPO, enjoys stability in training, robustness in choice of hyper-parameters, and has desirable
performance and convergence properties. This method is also a special case of CoPO when the
CoMDP of interest has only one state.
6 Conclusion
We presented competitive policy optimization CoPO, a novel PG-based RL method for two player
strictly competitive game. In CoPO, each player optimizes strategy by considering the interaction
with the environment and the opponent through game theoretic bilinear approximation to the game
objective. This method is instantiated to competitive policy gradient (CoPG) and trust region
competitive policy optimisation (TRCoPO) using value based and trust region approaches. We
theoretically studied these methods and provided PG theorems to show the properties of these
model-free RL approaches. We provided efficient implementation of these methods and empirically
showed that they provide stable and faster optimization, and also converge to more sophisticated
and competitive strategies. We dedicated this paper to two player zero-sum games, however, the
principles provided in this paper can be used for multi-player general games. In the future, we
plan to extend this study to multi-player general-sum games along with efficient implementation
of methods. Moreover, we plan to use the techniques proposed in partially observable domains,
and study imperfect information games [Azizzadenesheli et al., 2020]. Also, we aim to explore
opponent modelling approaches to relax the requirement of knowing the opponent’s parameters
during optimization.
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Appendix
A Algorithms
In this section, we briefly present the algorithms discussed in the paper, namely gradient descent
ascent (GDA), competitive policy gradient (CoPG), trust region gradient descent ascent (TRGDA)
and trust region competitive policy optimization (TRCoPO).
Algorithm 1: Gradient Descent Ascent Policy Gradient
Initialize (θ1, θ2)
for epoch : 1, 2, 3, .. until termination do
Collect samples under π(.|.; θ1), π(.|.; θ2),
Estimate Q, then Dθiη in Eq.7
Update θ1, θ2 using Eq. 4
end
Algorithm 2: Competitive Policy Gradient
Initialize (θ1, θ2)
for epoch : 1, 2, 3, .. until termination do
Collect samples under π(.|.; θ1), π(.|.; θ2),
Estimate Q, then Dθiη,Dθiθjη in Eqs. 7,8
Update θ1, θ2 using Eq. 6
end
Algorithm 3: Trust Region Gradient Descent Ascent
Initialize (θ1, θ2)
for epoch : 1, 2, 3, .. until termination do
Collect samples under π(.|.; θ1), π(.|.; θ2),
Estimate A, and DθiL using Eq. 61,
Update θi using Eq. 56, with bilinear term as a null matrix.
end
Algorithm 4: Trust Region Competitive Policy Optimisation
Initialize (θ1, θ2)
for epoch : 1, 2, 3, .. until termination do
Collect samples under π(.|.; θ1), π(.|.; θ2),
Estimate A, and DθiL,DθiθjL using Eq. 61,
Update θ1, θ2 using Eq. 56,
end
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B Recursion reasoning
When players play strategic games, in order to maximize their payoffs, they need to consider their
opponents’ strategies which in turn may depend on their strategies (and so on), resulting in the well
known infinite recursion in game theory. This is the recursive reasoning of the form what do I think
that you think that I think (and so on) and arises while acting rationally in multi-player games.
In this section we elaborate on the recursion in CoMDP and latter show how CoPO recovers the
infinite recursion reasoning Fig. 6. Recursion reasoning in CoMDP works as follows:
• Level 1 recursion: Each player considers how the environment, as the results of the agents’
current and future moves temporally evolves in favor of each agent,
• Level 2 recursion: Considering that the other agent also considers how the environment, as the
results of the agents’ current and future moves temporally evolves in favor of each agent,
• Level 3 recursion: Considering that the other agent also considers that the other agent also
considers how the environment, as the results of the agents’ current and future moves temporally
evolves in favor of each agent,
• .......
Level 1 recursion
Level 2 recursion
Level 3 recursion
Level 4 recursion
.....   Infinite recursion
Player 1
Player 2
Figure 6: Recursion reasoning. The notion of "Level N recursion" in the figure assumes that there is
no further recursive thinking (cloud) beyond that level.
In the special case of single state games (non sequential setting), this recursive reasoning boils
down to what each player thinks, the other player thinks that the other player thinks, .... . ( For
readers interested in the recursion reasoning in non-sequential but repeated episodic competitive
games (single state (or stateless) episodic CoMDP), stability and convergence of competitive gradient
optimization and the derivation of Eq. 6, we refer to [Schäfer and Anandkumar, 2019]).
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In the following we provide an intuitive explanation for the updates prescribed by CoPO. Let us
restate the Nash equilibrium of the bilinear game in Eq. 5 in its matrix form,[
θ1
θ2
]
←
[
θ1
θ2
]
+ α
[
I −αDθ1θ2η
αDθ2θ1η I
]−1 [
Dθ1η
−Dθ2η
]
. (13)
We rewrite the above mentioned update as[
θ1
θ2
]
←
[
θ1
θ2
]
+ α(I −A)−1
[
Dθ1η
−Dθ2η
]
, with A =
[
0 αDθ1θ2η
−αDθ2θ1η 0
]
. (14)
If it holds that the spectral radius of A is smaller than one, then we can use the Neumann series to
compute the inverse,
(I −A)−1 = lim
N→∞
N∑
k=0
Ak = I +A+A2 +A3 + ... . (15)
Using this expansion and its different orders as an approximation, e.g., up to k ∈ {0, . . . , N} for a
finite N , we derive policy update rules that have different levels of reasoning. For example, consider
the following levels of recursion reasoning:
• N = 0, (I−A)−1 → I, i.e., we approximate (I−A)−1 with the first term in the series presented
in Eq. 15, therefore, the update rule in Eq. 13 reduces to the GDA update rule. In this
case, each agent updates its parameters considering its current and future moves to gain a
higher total cumulative reward in the environment assuming the policy of the opponent stays
unchanged, [
θ1
θ2
]
←
[
θ1
θ2
]
+ α
[
Dθ1η
−Dθ2η
]
.
• N = 1, (I − A)−1 → I + A and the update rule in Eq. 13 reduce to the LOLA update rule.
In this case, each agent updates its parameters considering that the opponent updates its
parameters considering the other player stays unchanged. For example, player 1 updates its
parameter, assuming that player 2 also updates its parameter, but player 1 assumes that the
player 2 updates its parameter assuming the player 1 stays unchanged.[
θ1
θ2
]
←
[
θ1
θ2
]
+ α
[
Dθ1η − αDθ1θ2ηDθ2η
−Dθ2η − αDθ2θ1ηDθ1η
]
.
• N = 2, (I − A)−1 → I + A + A2, and the update rule is given by Eq. 16. In this case, the
agent updates its parameters considering that the opponent also considering that the agent
is considering to update parameters, such that its current and future moves increase the
probability of earning a higher total cumulative reward in the environment.[
θ1
θ2
]
←
[
θ1
θ2
]
+ α
[
Dθ1η − αDθ1θ2ηDθ2η − α2Dθ1θ2ηDθ2θ1ηDθ1η
−Dθ2η − αDθ2θ1ηDθ1η + α2Dθ2θ1ηDθ1θ2ηDθ2η
]
. (16)
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• lim N → ∞, (I −A)−1 → I +A+A2 +A3 + ..., we recover the Nash equilibrium in the limit
which corresponds to infinite recursion reasoning. In this case, the update rule in Eq. 13 is
given by Eq. 17 which resembles the Eq. 6.[
θ1
θ2
]
←
[
θ1
θ2
]
+ α
[ (
Id+ α2Dθ1θ2ηDθ2θ1η
)−1(
Dθ1η − αDθ1θ2ηDθ2η
)
−
(
Id+ α2Dθ2θ1ηDθ1θ2η
)−1(
Dθ2η + αDθ2θ1ηDθ1η
)] . (17)
We provided this discussion to motivate the importance of taking the game theoretic nature of a
given problem into account, in order to design an update.
C Proof of competitive policy gradient theorem
In this section, we first derive the gradient and bilinear terms in the form of score function. In the
subsequent subsections we provide complete proof of the competitive policy gradient theorem.
C.1 Proof for Prop. 1:
Proof. Given that the agents’ policies are parameterized with θ1 and θ2, we know that the game
objective is,
η(θ1, θ2) =
∫
τ
f(τ ; θ1, θ2)R(τ)dτ, (18)
thus, the gradient with respect to θi is given by
Dθiη =
∫
τ
Dθif(τ ; θ
1, θ2)R(τ)dτ, i ∈{1, 2} , (19)
for any pθ(τ) 6= 0 using Dθ log pθ(τ) = Dθpθ(τ)pθ(τ) from standard calculus and the definition of f(τ ; θ
1, θ2)
in Eq. 1, we can compute the gradient of the game objective,
Dθiη =
∫
τ
f(τ ; θ1, θ2)(Dθi log(
|τ |−1∏
k=0
π(ak|sk; θi)))R(τ)dτ ,
Let us define the score function as g(τ, θi) = Dθi(log(
∏|τ |−1
k=0 π(ak|sk; θ
i))) which results in,
Dθiη =
∫
τ
f(τ ; θ1, θ2)g(τ, θi)R(τ)dτ. (20)
By definition we know that the second order bilinear approximation of the game objective is
Dθ2θ1η(θ
1, θ2) = Dθ2Dθ1η(θ
1, θ2). Hence,
Dθ2θ1η =
∫
τ
Dθ2f(τ ; θ
1, θ2)g(τ, θ1)>R(τ)dτ .
=
∫
τ
f(τ ; θ1, θ2)(Dθ2 log(
|τ |−1∏
k=0
π(ak|sk; θ2)))g(τ, θ1)>R(τ)dτ ,
=
∫
τ
f(τ ; θ1, θ2)g(τ, θ2)g(τ, θ1)>R(τ)dτ .
which concludes the proof.
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C.2 Proof for Thm. 1
The competitive policy gradient theorem (Thm. 1) consists of two parts. We first provide the
derivation for the gradient and utilise this result to derive the bilinear term in the subsequent
subsection.
C.2.1 Derivation of gradient term Dθ1η
Proof. Using Eq. 2, which defines V (sk; θ1, θ2) and Q(sk, a1k, a
2
k; θ
1, θ2). We can write V (s0; θ1, θ2)
as,
V (s0; θ
1, θ2) =
∫
a10
∫
a20
π(a10|s0; θ1)π(a20|s0; θ2)Q(s0, a10, a20; θ1, θ2)da10da20 , (21)
where, Q(s0, a10, a
2
0; θ
1, θ2) = r(s0, a
1
0, a
2
0) + γ
∫
s1
T (s1|s0, a10, a20)V (s0; θ1, θ2)ds1 .
Hence, the gradient of the state-value V is,
Dθ1V (s0; θ
1, θ2) =
∫
a10
∫
a20
∂π(a10|s0; θ1)
∂θ1
π(a20|s0; θ2)Q(s0, a10, a20; θ1, θ2)da10da20
+
∫
a10
∫
a20
π(a10|s0; θ1)π(a20|s0; θ2)
∂Q(s0, a
1
0, a
2
0; θ
1, θ2)
∂θ1
da10da
2
0. (22)
The gradient of the state-action value Q, in term of the gradient of the state-value V is given by
Dθ1Q(s0, a
1
0, a
2
0; θ
1, θ2) = γ
∫
s1
T (s1|s0, a10, a20)
∂V (s1; θ
1, θ2)
∂θ1
ds1 . (23)
Substituting Eq. 23 in Eq. 22 results in,
Dθ1V (s0; θ
1, θ2) =
∫
a10
∫
a20
∂π(a10|s0; θ1)
∂θ1
π(a20|s0; θ2)Q(s0, a10, a20; θ1, θ2)da10da20 (24)
+
∫
a10
∫
a20
π(a10|s0; θ1)π(a20|s0; θ2)γ
∫
s1
T (s1|s0, a10, a20)
∂V (s1; θ
1, θ2)
∂θ1
ds1da
1
0da
2
0 .
By exploring the recursive nature of the state-value V and Dθ1V (s0; θ1, θ2), we can unroll Eq. 24 as,
Dθ1V (s0; θ
1, θ2) =
∫
a10
∫
a20
∂π(a10|s0; θ1)
∂θ1
π(a20|s0; θ2)Q(s0, a10, a20; θ1, θ2)da10da20 (25)
+
∫
a10
∫
a20
π(a10|s0; θ1)π(a20|s0; θ2)γ
∫
s1
T (s1|s0, a10, a20)(∫
a11
∫
a21
∂π(a11|s1; θ1)
∂θ1
π(a21|s1; θ2)Q(s1, a11, a21; θ1, θ2)da11da21
+
∫
a11
∫
a21
π(a11|s1; θ1)π(a21|s1; θ2)γ
∫
s2
T (s2|s1, a11, a21)
∂V (s2; θ
1, θ2)
∂θ1
ds2da
1
1da
2
1
)
ds1da
1
0da
2
0 .
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To find the derivative of the expected return, we can use the definition of the expected return
η(θ1, θ2) and Eq. 25, which results in
Dθ1η(θ
1, θ2) =
∫
s0
p(s0)Dθ1V (s0; θ
1, θ2)ds0
=
∫
s0
p(s0)
∫
a10
∫
a20
∂π(a10|s0; θ1)
∂θ1
π(a20|s0; θ2)Q(s0, a10, a20; θ1, θ2)da10da20ds0
+γ
∫
τ
f(τ0:0, s1; θ
1, θ2)
∂π(a11|s1; θ1)
∂θ1
π(a21|s1; θ2)Q(s1, a11, a21; θ1, θ2)dτ0:1
+ γ2
∫
τ
f(τ0:1, s2; θ
1, θ2)
∂V (s2; θ
1, θ2)
∂θ1
ds2dτ0:1. (26)
Similar to the two previous step, unrolling and marginalisation can be continued for the entire
length of the trajectory, which results in,
Dθ1η(θ
1, θ2) =
∫
τ
|τ |−1∑
k=0
γkf(τ0:k−1,sk; θ
1, θ2)
∫
a1k
∫
a2k
∂π(a1k|sk;θ1)
∂θ1
π(a2k|sk;θ2)Q(sk,a1k,a2k;θ1, θ2)dτ (27)
=
∫
τ
|τ |−1∑
k=0
γkf(τ0:k; θ
1, θ2)
∂ log π(a1k|sk; θ1)
∂θ1
Q(sk, a
1
k, a
2
k; θ
1, θ2)dτ. (28)
This concludes our derivation of the gradient term of the game objective for the two agent case.
C.2.2 Derivation of Bilinear term Dθ1θ2η
Proof: By definition we know that Dθ1θ2V (s0; θ1, θ2) = Dθ1(Dθ2V (s0; θ1, θ2)). Thus we can use
Dθ2V (s0; θ
1, θ2) as defined in Eq. 22 and differentiating with respect to θ1, thereby we get,
Dθ1θ2V (s0; θ
1, θ2) =
∫
a10
∫
a20
∂π(a10|s0; θ1)
∂θ1
∂π(a20|s0; θ2)
∂θ2
>
Q(s0, a
1
0, a
2
0; θ
1, θ2)da10da
2
0
+
∫
a10
∫
a20
∂π(a10|s0; θ1)
∂θ1
π(a20|s0; θ2)
∂Q(s0, a
1
0, a
2
0; θ
1, θ2)
∂θ2
>
da10da
2
0
+
∫
a10
∫
a20
π(a10|s0; θ1)
∂Q(s0, a
1
0, a
2
0; θ
1, θ2)
∂θ1
∂π(a20|s0; θ2)
∂θ2
>
da10da
2
0
+
∫
a10
∫
a20
π(a10|s0; θ1)π(a20|s0; θ2)
∂2Q(s0, a
1
0, a
2
0; θ
1, θ2)
∂θ1∂θ2
da10da
2
0. (29)
Exploiting the recursive structure of Dθ1θ2V (s0; θ1, θ2), we can evaluate Dθ1θ2V (s1; θ1, θ2) and
substitute it back in Eq. 29,we get,
Dθ1θ2V (s0; θ
1, θ2) =
∫
a10
∫
a20
∂π(a10|s0; θ1)
∂θ1
∂π(a20|s0; θ2)
∂θ2
>
Q(s0, a
1
0, a
2
0; θ
1, θ2)da10da
2
0 (30)
+
∫
a10
∫
a20
∂π(a10|s0; θ1)
∂θ1
π(a20|s0; θ2)
∂Q(s0, a
1
0, a
2
0; θ
1, θ2)
∂θ2
>
da10da
2
0
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+
∫
a10
∫
a20
π(a10|s0; θ1)
∂Q(s0, a
1
0, a
2
0; θ
1, θ2)
∂θ1
∂π(a20|s0; θ2)
∂θ2
>
da10da
2
0
+
∫
a10
∫
a20
π(a10|s0; θ1)π(a20|s0; θ2)
(
γ
∫
s1
T (s1|s0, a10, a20)(∫
a11
∫
a21
∂π(a11|s1; θ1)
∂θ1
∂π(a21|s1; θ2)
∂θ2
>
Q(s1, a
1
1, a
2
1; θ
1, θ2)da11da
2
1
+
∫
a11
∫
a21
∂π(a11|s1; θ1)
∂θ1
π(a21|s1; θ2)
∂Q(s1, a
1
1, a
2
1; θ
1, θ2)
∂θ2
>
da11da
2
1
+
∫
a11
∫
a21
π(a11|s1; θ1)
∂Q(s1, a
1
1, a
2
1; θ
1, θ2)
∂θ1
∂π(a21|s1; θ2)
∂θ2
>
da11da
2
1
+
∫
a11
∫
a21
π(a11|s1; θ1)π(a21|s1; θ2)γ
∫
s2
T (s2|s1, a11, a21)
∂2V (s2; θ
1, θ2)
∂θ2∂θ1
ds2da
1
1da
2
1
)
ds1
)
da10da
2
0.
Exploring the recursive structure, quickly leads to long sequences of terms, to deal with this let us
define a short hand notation, the first term in Eq. 29 is denoted by b0, second term by c0, third
term by d0, forth term as e0, note that the subscript indicates the time step and let Prk = Pr(sk →
sk+1, θ
1, θ2) be the state transition probability summed over all actions. When investigating Eq. 30
note that the forth term of Eq. 29 e0, expanded to e0 = γ
∫
s1
Pr0(b1 + c1 + d1 + e1)ds1. Thus,
recursively applying this insight and using our short hand notation results in,
Dθ1θ2V (s0; θ
1, θ2) =b0+c0+d0+γ
∫
s1
Pr0
(
b1+c1+d1+γ
∫
s2
Pr1
(
b2+c2+d2
+γ
∫
s3
Pr2
(
b3+c3+d3+γ
∫
s4
Pr3
(
...
)
ds4
)
ds3
)
ds2
)
ds1
=b0+γ
∫
s1
Pr0
(
b1+γ
∫
s2
Pr1
(
b2+γ
∫
s3
Pr2
(
b3+γ
∫
s4
Pr3
(
...
)
ds4
)
ds3
)
ds2
)
ds1
+c0+γ
∫
s1
Pr0
(
c1+γ
∫
s2
Pr1
(
c2+γ
∫
s3
Pr2
(
c3+γ
∫
s4
Pr3
(
...
)
ds4
)
ds3
)
ds2
)
ds1
+d0+γ
∫
s1
Pr0
(
d1+γ
∫
s2
Pr1
(
d2+γ
∫
s3
Pr2
(
d3+γ
∫
s4
Pr3
(
...
)
ds4
)
ds3
)
ds2
)
ds1.
Summing over the initial state distribution results in,
Dθ1θ2η(θ
1, θ2)=
∫
s0
p(s0)Dθ1θ2V (s0; θ
1, θ2)ds0
=
∫
s0
p(s0)
(
b0+γ
∫
s1
Pr0
(
b1+γ
∫
s2
Pr1
(
b2+γ
∫
s3
Pr2
(
b3+γ
∫
s4
Pr3
(
...
)
ds4
)
ds3
)
ds2
)
ds1
)
ds0
+
∫
s0
p(s0)
(
c0+γ
∫
s1
Pr0
(
c1+γ
∫
s2
Pr1
(
c2+γ
∫
s3
Pr2
(
c3+γ
∫
s4
Pr3
(
...
)
ds4
)
ds3
)
ds2
)
ds1
)
ds0
+
∫
s0
p(s0)
(
d0+γ
∫
s1
Pr0
(
d1+γ
∫
s2
Pr1
(
d2+γ
∫
s3
Pr2
(
d3+γ
∫
s4
Pr3
(
...
)
ds4
)
ds3
)
ds2
)
ds1
)
ds0. (31)
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Eq. 31 is clearly build up by three terms the first depending on bk, the second on ck and the last on dk,
let us denote these terms as T1,T2 and T3 respectively. Thus we have Dθ1θ2η(θ1, θ2) = T1 +T2 +T3.
Given this separation, we can tackle each part separately.
Solving for the T1:
To bring T1 in Eq. 31, to the final form in our theorem, let us substitute the terms for bk back in,
T1 =
∫
s0
p(s0)
(∫
a10
∫
a20
∂π(a10|s0; θ1)
∂θ1
∂π(a20|s0; θ2)
∂θ2
>
Q(s0, a
1
0, a
2
0; θ
1, θ2)da10da
2
0
+γ
∫
s1
Pr(s1|s0; θ1, θ2)
(∫
a11
∫
a21
∂π(a11|s1; θ1)
∂θ1
∂π(a21|s1; θ2)
∂θ2
>
Q(s1, a
1
1, a
2
1; θ
1, θ2)da11da
2
1
+
∫
a11
∫
a21
π(a11|s1; θ1)π(a21|s1; θ2)γ
∫
s2
T (s2|s1, a11, a21)
(
...
)
ds2da
1
1da
2
1
)
ds1da
1
0da
2
0
)
ds0. (32)
Similar to Eq. 26 we can unrolling and marginalizing, which allows us to bring it into a compact
form,
T1 =
∫
τ
|τ |−1∑
k=0
γkf(τ0:k−1, sk; θ
1, θ2)
∂π(a1k|sk; θ1)
∂θ1
∂π(a2k|sk; θ2)
∂θ2
>
Q(sk, a
1
k, a
2
k; θ
1, θ2)dτ
=
∫
τ
|τ |−1∑
k=0
γkf(τ0:k; θ
1, θ2)
∂ log π(a1k|sk; θ1)
∂θ1
∂ log π(a2k|sk; θ2)
∂θ2
>
Q(sk, a
1
k, a
2
k; θ
1, θ2)dτ. (33)
Solving for the T2:
For T2 in Eq. 31, we again substitute the ck terms back in, which gets us,
T2 =
∫
s0
p(s0)
(∫
a10
∫
a20
∂π(a10|s0; θ1)
∂θ1
π(a20|s0; θ2)
∂Q(s0, a
1
0, a
2
0; θ
1, θ2)
∂θ2
>
da10da
2
0
+
∫
a10
∫
a20
π(a10|s0; θ1)π(a20|s0; θ2)γ
∫
s1
T (s1|s0, a10, a20)(∫
a11
∫
a21
∂π(a11|s1; θ1)
∂θ1
π(a21|s1; θ2)
∂Q(s1, a
1
1, a
2
1; θ
1, θ2)
∂θ2
>
da11da
2
1
+
∫
a11
∫
a21
π(a11|s1; θ1)π(a21|s1; θ2)γ
∫
s2
T (s2|s1, a11, a21)
(
...
)
ds2 da
1
1da
2
1
)
ds1da
1
0da
2
0
)
ds0. (34)
Note that T2 contains
∂Q(sk,a
1
k,a
2
k;θ
1,θ2)
∂θ2
. We can unroll ∂Q(s0,a
1
0,a
2
0;θ
1,θ2)
∂θ2
using Eq. 23 and Eq. 24, till
the next state s1, which results in,
T2 =
∫
s0
p(s0)
(∫
a10
∫
a20
∂π(a10|s0; θ1)
∂θ1
π(a20|s0; θ2)
∫
s1
γT (s1|s0, a10, a20)
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(∫
a11
∫
a21
π(a11|s1; θ1)
∂π(a21|s1; θ2)
∂θ2
Q(s1, a
1
1, a
2
1; θ
1, θ2)da11da
2
1
+
∫
a11
∫
a21
π(a11|s1; θ1)π(a21|s1; θ2)
∂Q(s1, a
1
1, a
2
1; θ
1, θ2)
∂θ2
da11da
2
1
)>
ds1da
1
0da
2
0
+
∫
a10
∫
a20
π(a10|s0; θ1)π(a20|s0; θ2)γ
∫
s1
T (s1|s0, a10, a20)(∫
a11
∫
a21
∂π(a11|s1; θ1)
∂θ1
π(a21|s1; θ2)
∂Q(s1, a
1
1, a
2
1; θ
1, θ2)
∂θ2
>
da11da
2
1
+
∫
a11
∫
a21
π(a11|s1; θ1)π(a21|s1; θ2)γ
∫
s2
T (s2|s1, a11, a21)
(
...
)
ds2da
1
1da
2
1
)
ds1da
1
0da
2
0
)
ds0.
Using log trick (Dθ log pθ(τ) = Dθpθ(τ)/pθ(τ)) and combining terms together, we get,
T2 =
∫
s0
p(s0)
(∫
a10
∫
a20
π(a10|s0; θ1)π(a20|s0; θ2)
∫
s1
γT (s1|s0, a10, a20)
∫
a11
∫
a21
π(a11|s1; θ1)π(a21|s1; θ2)(
∂ log π(a10|s0; θ1)
∂θ1
∂ log π(a21|s1; θ2)
∂θ2
>
Q(s1, a
1
1, a
2
1; θ
1, θ2)
+
(
∂ log π(a10|s0; θ1)
∂θ1
+
∂ log π(a11|s1; θ1)
∂θ1
)
∂Q(s1, a
1
1, a
2
1; θ
1, θ2)
∂θ2
>
+ γ
∫
s2
T (s2|s1, a11, a21)
(
...
)
ds2
)
da11da
2
1ds1da
1
0da
2
0
)
ds0
=
∫
τ
f(τ0:1; θ
1, θ2)γ
(
∂ log π(a10|s0; θ1)
∂θ1
∂ log π(a21|s1; θ2)
∂θ2
>
Q(s1, a
1
1, a
2
1; θ
1, θ2)
+
(
∂ log π(a10|s0;θ1)
∂θ1
+
∂ log π(a11|s1;θ1)
∂θ1
)
∂Q(s1, a
1
1, a
2
1;θ
1, θ2)
∂θ2
>
+γ
∫
s2
T (s2|s1, a11, a21)
(
...
)
ds2
)
dτ0:1.
We can use the identical method for the remaining ∂Q(sk,a
1
k,a
2
k;θ
1,θ2)
∂θ2
. Thus unrolling this term for one
time step and using the log trick to combine terms. For example unrolling the second step results in,
T2 =
∫
τ
f(τ0:1;θ
1, θ2)γ
∂ log π(a10|s0; θ1)
∂θ1
∂ log π(a21|s1;θ2)
∂θ2
>
Q(s1, a
1
1, a
2
1; θ
1, θ2)dτ0:1
+
∫
τ
f(τ0:2;θ
1, θ2)γ2
((
∂ log π(a10|s0;θ1)
∂θ1
+
∂ log π(a11|s1;θ1)
∂θ1
)
∂ log π(a22|s2; θ2)
∂θ2
>
Q(s2, a
1
2, a
2
2;θ
1, θ2)
+
(
∂ log π(a10|s0;θ1)
∂θ1
+
∂ log π(a11|s1;θ1)
∂θ1
+
∂ log π(a12|s2;θ1)
∂θ1
)
∂Q(s2, a
1
2, a
2
2;θ
1, θ2)
∂θ2
>
+
(
...
))
dτ0:2.
26
Finally, on unrolling for |τ | steps we get,
T2 =
∫
τ
|τ |−1∑
k=1
γkf(τ0:k;θ
1, θ2)
∂ log(
∏k−1
i=0 π(a
1
i |si;θ1))
∂θ1
∂ log π(a2k|sk;θ2))
∂θ2
>
Q(sk, a
1
k, a
2
k;θ
1, θ2)dτ. (35)
Solving for the T3:
In T3 in Eq. 31, similar to the previous two terms we again substitute dk back in, which results in,
T3 =
∫
s0
p(s0)
(∫
a10
∫
a20
π(a10|s0; θ1)
∂Q(s0, a
1
0, a
2
0; θ
1, θ2)
∂θ1
∂π(a20|s0; θ2)
∂θ2
>
da10da
2
0
+
∫
a10
∫
a20
π(a10|s0; θ1)π(a20|s0; θ2)γ
∫
s1
T (s1|s0; a10, a20)(∫
a11
∫
a21
π(a11|s1; θ1)
∂Q(s1, a
1
1, a
2
1; θ
1, θ2)
∂θ1
∂π(a21|s1; θ2)
∂θ2
>
da11da
2
1
+
∫
a11
∫
a21
π(a11|s1; θ1)π(a21|s1; θ2)γ
∫
s2
T (s2|s1, a11, a21)
(
...
)
ds2da
1
1da
2
1
)
ds1da
1
0da
2
0
)
ds0.
Similar to T2, T3 contains
∂Q(sk,a
1
k,a
2
k;θ
1,θ2)
∂θ1
, using the same approach and unfold this term using
Eq. 23 and Eq. 24 for one step results in,
T3 =
∫
s0
p(s0)
(∫
a10
∫
a20
π(a10|s0; θ1)
∫
s1
γT (s1|s0; a10, a20)(∫
a11
∫
a21
∂π(a11|s1; θ1)
∂θ1
π(a21|s1; θ2)Q(s1, a11, a21; θ1, θ2)da11da21
+
∫
a11
∫
a21
π(a11|s1; θ1)π(a21|s1; θ2)
∂Q(s1, a
1
1, a
2
1; θ
1, θ2)
∂θ1
da11da
2
1)
ds1
∂π(a20|s0; θ2)
∂θ2
>
da10da
2
0
+
∫
a10
∫
a20
π(a10|s0; θ1)π(a20|s0; θ2)γ
∫
s1
T (s1|s0; a10, a20)(∫
a11
∫
a21
π(a11|s1; θ1)
∂Q(s1, a
1
1, a
2
1; θ
1, θ2)
∂θ1
∂π(a21|s1; θ2)
∂θ2
>
da11da
2
1
+
∫
a11
∫
a21
π(a11|s1; θ1)π(a21|s1; θ2)γ
∫
s2
T (s2|s1, a11, a21)
(
...
)
ds2da
1
1da
2
1
)
ds1da
1
0da
2
0
)
ds0.
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Using the log trick (Dθ log pθ(τ) = Dθpθ(τ)/pθ(τ)) and combining terms together, we get:
T3 =
∫
s0
p(s0)
(∫
a10
∫
a20
π(a10|s0; θ1)π(a20|s0; θ2)
∫
s1
γT (s1|s0; a10, a20)
∫
a11
∫
a21
π(a11|s1; θ1)π(a21|s1; θ2)(
∂ log π(a10|s0; θ1)
∂θ1
∂ log π(a21|s1; θ2)
∂θ2
>
Q(s1, a
1
1, a
2
1; θ
1, θ2)
+
∂Q(s1, a
1
1, a
2
1; θ
1, θ2)
∂θ1
(
∂ log π(a20|s0; θ2)
∂θ2
+
∂ log π(a21|s1; θ2)
∂θ2
)>
+ γ
∫
s2
T (s2|s1, a11, a21)
(
...
)
ds2
)
da11da
2
1ds1da
1
0da
2
0
)
ds0,
by simplifying the notation we get,
T3 =
∫
τ
f(τ0:1; θ
1, θ2)γ
(
∂ log π(a10|s0; θ1)
∂θ1
∂ log π(a21|s1; θ2)
∂θ2
>
Q(s1, a
1
1, a
2
1; θ
1, θ2)
+
∂Q(s1, a
1
1, a
2
1;θ
1, θ2)
∂θ1
(
∂ log π(a20|s0;θ2)
∂θ2
+
∂ log π(a21|s1;θ2)
∂θ2
)>
+γ
∫
s2
T (s2|s1,a11,a21)
(
...
)
ds2
)
dτ0:1.
The remaining terms in the recursive structure again contain terms of the form ∂Q(sk,a
1
k,a
2
k;θ
1,θ2)
∂θ1
,
which we simplify in a similar fashion by unfolding for one step, for example unfolding the second
term for one step results in,
T3 =
∫
τ
f(τ0:1; θ
1, θ2)γ
∂ log π(a10|s0; θ1)
∂θ1
∂ log π(a21|s1; θ2)
∂θ2
>
Q(s1, a
1
1, a
2
1; θ
1, θ2)dτ0:1
+
∫
τ
f(τ0:2;θ
1, θ2)γ2
(
∂ log π(a12|s2; θ1)
∂θ1
(
∂ log π(a20|s0;θ2)
∂θ2
+
∂ log π(a21|s1;θ2)
∂θ2
)>
Q(s2, a
1
2, a
2
2;θ
1, θ2)
+
∂Q(s2, a
1
2, a
2
2; θ
1, θ2)
∂θ1
(
∂ log π(a20|s0; θ2)
∂θ2
+
∂ log π(a21|s1; θ2)
∂θ2
+
∂ log π(a22|s2; θ2)
∂θ2
)>
+
(
...
))
dτ0:2.
Finally on unrolling for |τ | steps we get,
=
∫
τ
|τ |−1∑
k=1
γkf(τ0:k; θ
1, θ2)
∂ log π(a1k|sk; θ1)
∂θ1
∂ log(
∏k−1
l=0 π(a
2
l |sl; θ2))
∂θ2
>
Q(sk, a
1
k, a
2
k; θ
1, θ2)dτ. (36)
Combining all 3 terms:
By Eq. 31 we know that the bilinear term of the game objective is given by Dθ1θ2η(θ1, θ2) =
T1 + T2 + T3, or in other words the sum of the three terms derived above. Thus, we derived that,
Dθ1θ2η(θ
1, θ2)=
∫
τ
|τ |−1∑
k=0
γkf(τ0:k; θ
1, θ2)
∂ log π(a1k|sk; θ1)
∂θ1
∂ log π(a2k|sk; θ2)
∂θ2
>
Q(sk, a
1
k, a
2
k; θ
1, θ2)dτ
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+
∫
τ
|τ |−1∑
k=1
γkf(τ0:k; θ
1, θ2)
∂ log(
∏k−1
l=0 π(a
1
l |sl; θ1))
∂θ1
∂ log π(a2k|sk; θ2)
∂θ2
>
Q(sk, a
1
k, a
2
k; θ
1, θ2)dτ
+
∫
τ
|τ |−1∑
k=1
γkf(τ0:k; θ
1, θ2)
∂ log π(a1k|sk; θ1)
∂θ1
∂ log(
∏k−1
l=0 π(a
2
l |sl; θ2))
∂θ2
>
Q(sk, a
1
k, a
2
k; θ
1, θ2)dτ. (37)
This concludes our derivation of the bilinear term of the game objective.
D Generalization of CoPG to variants of return
D.1 Estimation of gradient and bilinear term using a baseline
The gradient and bilinear terms can be estimated using Eq. 7 and Eq. 8 based on Q(sk, a1k, a
2
k; θ
1, θ2)
the state-action value function. But in practice, this can perform poorly due to variance and missing
the notion of relative improvement. During learning, policy parameters are updated to increase the
probability of visiting good trajectories and reducing chances of encountering bad trajectories. But,
let us assume good samples have zero reward and bad samples have a negative reward. In this case,
the policy distribution will move away from the negative samples but can move in any direction
as zero reward does not provide information on being better a state-action pair. This causes high
variance and slow learning. In another case, let us assume that a non zero constant is added to the
reward function for all states-action pairs, ideally this constant factor should not affect the policy
update but in the current formulation using Q(sk, a1k, a
2
k; θ
1, θ2) it does because the notion of better
or worse sample is with respect to zero. Hence, missing the notion of relative improvement.
To mitigate the issues, a baseline b can be subtracted from Q(s, a1k, a
2
k; θ
1, θ2). The baseline can
be any random variable as long as it is not a function of a1k and a
2
k [Sutton and Barto, 2018]. For
an MDP, a good baseline b is a function of the state b(s), because let say in some states all actions
have high values and we need a high baseline to differentiate the higher valued actions from the less
highly valued ones; in other states all actions will have low values and a low baseline is appropriate.
This is equivalent to Q(sk, a1k, a
2
k; θ
1, θ2)←− Q(sk, a1k, a2k; θ1, θ2)− b(sk) in Eq. 8 and Eq. 7.
D.2 Extending Thm. 1 for gradient and bilinear estimation using advantage
function
A popular choice for a baseline b(s) is V (s, θ1, θ2), which results in the advantage function defined in
Sec. 3.1. In Thm. 3 we extend Thm. 1 to estimate gradient and bilinear terms using the advantage
function.
Theorem 3. Given that the advantage function is defined as A(s, a1, a2; θ1, θ2) = Q(s, a1, a2; θ1, θ2)−
V (s; θ1, θ2) and given Eq. 7, then for player i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j, it holds that,
Dθiη=
∫
τ
|τ |−1∑
k=0
γkf(τ0:k; θ
1, θ2)Dθi(log π(a
i
k|sk; θi))A(sk, a1k, a2k; θ1, θ2)dτ, (38)
Dθiθjη =
∫
τ
|τ |−1∑
k=0
γkf(τ0:k; θ
1, θ2)Dθi(log π(a
i
k|sk; θi))Dθj (log π(a
j
k|sk; θ
j))>A(sk, a
1
k, a
2
k; θ
1, θ2)dτ
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+
∫
τ
|τ |−1∑
k=1
γkf(τ0:k; θ
1, θ2)Dθi(log
k−1∏
l=0
π(ail|sl; θi))Dθj (log π(a
j
k|sk; θ
j))>A(sk, a
1
k, a
2
k; θ
1, θ2)dτ
+
∫
τ
|τ |−1∑
k=1
γkf(τ0:k; θ
1, θ2)Dθi(log π(a
i
k|sk; θi))Dθj (log
k−1∏
l=0
π(ajl |sl; θ
j))>A(sk, a
1
k, a
2
k; θ
1, θ2)dτ. (39)
Proof. The RHS of Eq. 38 is,
∫
τ
|τ |−1∑
k=0
γkf(τ0:k; θ
1, θ2)Dθi(log π(a
i
k|sk; θi))A(sk, a1k, a2k; θ1, θ2)dτ
=
∫
τ
|τ |−1∑
k=0
γkf(τ0:k; θ
1, θ2)Dθi(log π(a
i
k|sk; θi))(Q(s, a1, a2; θ1, θ2)− V (s; θ1, θ2))dτ
= Dθiη −
∫
τ
|τ |−1∑
k=0
γkf(τ0:k; θ
1, θ2)Dθi(log π(a
i
k|sk; θi))V (s; θ1, θ2))dτ
= Dθiη −
∫
τ
|τ |−1∑
k=0
γkf(τ0:k−1, sk; θ
1, θ2)Dθi(π(a
i
k|sk; θi))π(a
j
k|sk; θ
j)V (s; θ1, θ2))dτ (40)
= Dθiη.
The last equality holds since the value function V (s; θ1, θ2) is independent of the actions, and this
concludes the proof for Dθiη. Now consider, the RHS of Eq. 39,
∫
τ
|τ |−1∑
k=0
γkf(τ0:k; θ
1, θ2)Dθi(log π(a
i
k|sk; θi))Dθj (log π(a
j
k|sk; θ
j))>A(sk, a
1
k, a
2
k; θ
1, θ2)dτ (41)
+
∫
τ
|τ |−1∑
k=1
γkf(τ0:k; θ
1, θ2)Dθi(log
k−1∏
l=0
π(ail|sl; θi))Dθj (log π(a
j
k|sk; θ
j))>A(sk, a
1
k, a
2
k; θ
1, θ2)dτ
+
∫
τ
|τ |−1∑
k=1
γkf(τ0:k; θ
1, θ2)Dθi(log π(a
i
k|sk; θi))Dθj (log
k−1∏
l=0
π(ajl |sl; θ
j))>A(sk, a
1
k, a
2
k; θ
1, θ2)dτ.
Using definition of Advantage function, we can equivalently write,∫
τ
|τ |−1∑
k=0
γkf(τ0:k;θ
1, θ2)Dθi(log π(a
i
k|sk;θi))Dθj (log π(a
j
k|sk;θ
j))>(Q(sk,a
1
k,a
2
k;θ
1, θ2)−V(sk;θ1, θ2))dτ
+
∫
τ
|τ |−1∑
k=1
γkf(τ0:k;θ
1, θ2)Dθi(log
k−1∏
l=0
π(ail|sl;θi))Dθj (log π(a
j
k|sk;θ
j))>(Q(sk,a
1
k,a
2
k;θ
1, θ2)−V(sk;θ1, θ2))dτ
+
∫
τ
|τ |−1∑
k=1
γkf(τ0:k;θ
1, θ2)Dθi(log π(a
i
k|sk;θi))Dθj (log
k−1∏
l=0
π(ajl |sl;θ
j))>(Q(sk,a
1
k,a
2
k;θ
1, θ2)−V(sk;θ1, θ2))dτ.
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Using Eq. 8, we can equivalently separate the expression in Dθiθjη and terms depending on the value
function,
Dθiθjη −
∫
τ
|τ |−1∑
k=0
γkf(τ0:k; θ
1, θ2)Dθi(log π(a
i
k|sk; θi))Dθj (log π(a
j
k|sk; θ
j))>V (sk; θ
1, θ2)dτ
−
∫
τ
|τ |−1∑
k=1
γkf(τ0:k; θ
1, θ2)Dθi(log
k−1∏
l=0
π(ail|sl; θi))Dθj (log π(a
j
k|sk; θ
j))>V (sk; θ
1, θ2)dτ
−
∫
τ
|τ |−1∑
k=1
γkf(τ0:k; θ
1, θ2)Dθi(log π(a
i
k|sk; θi))Dθj (log
k−1∏
l=0
π(ajl |sl; θ
j))>V (sk; θ
1, θ2)dτ, (42)
note that for any pθ(τ) 6= 0 using Dθ log pθ(τ) = Dθpθ(τ)/pθ(τ), which allows us to further simplify
the expression to,
Dθiθjη −
∫
τ
|τ |−1∑
k=0
γkf(τ0:k−1, sk; θ
1, θ2)Dθi(π(a
i
k|sk; θi))Dθj (π(a
j
k|sk; θ
j))>V (sk; θ
1, θ2)dτ
−
∫
τ
|τ |−1∑
k=1
γkf(τ0:k−1, sk, a
i
k; θ
1, θ2)Dθi(log
k−1∏
l=0
π(ail|sl; θi))Dθj (π(a
j
k|sk; θ
j))>V (sk; θ
1, θ2)dτ
−
∫
τ
|τ |−1∑
k=1
γkf(τ0:k−1, sk, a
j
k; θ
1, θ2)Dθi(π(a
i
k|sk; θi))Dθj (log
k−1∏
l=0
π(ajl |sl; θ
j))>V (sk; θ
1, θ2)dτ
= Dθiθjη, (43)
where the last equality holds since V (sk; θ1, θ2) is independent of the actions of any player. This
concludes our proof.
D.3 Approaches to estimate advantage function
There exist multiple approaches to estimate A(sk, a1k, a
2
k; θ
1, θ2), for example Monte Carlo (Eq. 44),
1-step TD residual (Eq. 45) and t-step TD residual (Eq. 46)
A(sk, a
1
k, a
2
k; θ
1, θ2) =
|τ |−1∑
j=k
γj−kr(sj , a
1
j , a
2
j )− V (sk; θ1, θ2), (44)
A(sk, a
1
k, a
2
k; θ
1, θ2) =r(sk, a
1
k, a
2
k) + γV (sk+1; θ
1, θ2)− V (sk; θ1, θ2), (45)
A(sk, a
1
k, a
2
k; θ
1, θ2) =r(sk,a
1
k,a
2
k)+γr(sk+1,a
1
k+1,a
2
k+1)+...+γ
t−1r(sk+t−1,a
1
k+t−1,a
2
k+t−1)
+ γtV (sk+t;θ
1, θ2)− V (sk;θ1, θ2). (46)
The Monte Carlo approach experience high variance in gradient estimation, particularly with long
trajectories, which may result in slow learning or not learning at all. On the other hand 1-step
TD residual has bias towards initialization of the value function. t-step TD residual can lower this
effect up to an extent. To trade between bias and variance we propose to use generalized advantage
estimation (GAE) [Schulman et al., 2016], which is an exponentially λ weighted average over t-step
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estimators. It is given by,
AGAE(sk, a
1
k, a
2
k; θ
1, θ2) =
|τ |−1∑
l=0
(λγ)lδVl+k,
where, δVk = r(sk, a
1
k, a
2
k) + γV (sk+1; θ
1, θ2)− V (sk; θ1, θ2).
Note that at λ = 0, AGAE(sk, a1k, a
2
k; θ
1, θ2) reduces to 1-step TD residual and at λ = 1 it is
equivalent to the Monte Carlo approach to estimate the advantage function. We refer the interested
reader to [Schulman et al., 2016] for more details.
E Training by self-play
As proposed in Alg. 6, we use CoPG to learn a policy for each player, however, it is also possible to
use the competitive policy gradient algorithm to learn game strategies by self-play. In contrast to
two player training where each player has its own policy model, in self-play, we have one model for
both players. Each player then samples actions from the same policy model for two different state
instances s1 = [sl1, sl2] and s2 = [sl2, sl1], where sl1 and sl2 are the local states of player 1 and player
2 respectively. Let τ =
(
(sl1k ,s
l2
k , a
1
k, a
2
k, rk)
|τ1|−1
k=0 , s|τ |
)
be a trajectory obtained in the game. Using
Eq. 7 and Eq. 8, we can define the gradient and bilinear terms as Dθηi and Dθθηi , i, j ∈ {1, 2},
i 6= j,
Dθη
i =
∫
τ
|τ |−1∑
k=0
γkf(τ0:k; θ)Dθ(log π(a
i
k|sik; θ))Q(s1k, a1k, a2k; θ)dτ, (47)
Dθθη
i =
∫
τ
|τ |−1∑
k=0
γkf(τ0:k; θ)Dθ(log π(a
i
k|sik; θ))Dθ(log π(a
j
k|s
j
k; θ))
>Q(s1k, a
1
k, a
2
k; θ)dτ
+
∫
τ
|τ |−1∑
k=1
γkf(τ0:k; θ)Dθ(log
k−1∏
l=0
π(ail|sil; θ))Dθ(log π(a
j
k|s
j
k; θ))
>Q(s1k, a
1
k, a
2
k; θ)dτ
+
∫
τ
|τ |−1∑
k=1
γkf(τ0:k; θ)Dθ(log π(a
i
k|sik; θ))Dθ(log
k−1∏
l=0
π(ajl |s
j
l ; θ))
>Q(s1k, a
1
k, a
2
k; θ)dτ. (48)
Utilizing the gradients and bilinear term in Eq. 47 and Eq. 48, the parameters are updated twice
which results in the following update rule for self-play,
θt ← θ + α
(
Id+ α2Dθθη
1Dθθη
2
)−1(
Dθη
1 − αDθθη1Dθη2
)
,
θ ← θt − α
(
Id+ α2Dθθη
2Dθθη
1
)−1(
Dθη
2 + αDθθη
2Dθη
1
)
, (49)
where θt is a temporary intermediate variable.3
We tested the self-play algorithm on the Markov soccer game, which is discussed in more detail
in Sec. H.5.We focus in this comparison on the Markov soccer game since it is strategic enough while
3Of course, there are other ways to come up with self-play updates. For example, one can use Eq. 6 with θ1 = θ2 = θ
to update parameters, then set θ ← (θ1 + θ2)/2.
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Algorithm 5: Competitive Policy Gradient with self-play
Input: π(.|.; θ), N, B, α, Choice of A(s1, a1, a2; θ) mentioned in Sec 3.1
for epoch : e = 1 to N do
for batch : b = 1 to B do
for k = 0 to |τ | − 1 do
Sample a1k ∼ π(a1k|s1k; θ), a2k ∼ π(a2k|s2k; θ).
Execute actions ak = (a1k, a
2
k)
Record {sl1k , sl2k , a1k, a2k, rk} in τb
end
Record τb in M
end
1. Estimate A(s1, a1, a2; θ) with τ in M
2. Estimate Dθη1, Dθη2, Dθθη1, Dθθη2 using Eq. 47 and Eq. 48
3. Update θ using Eq. 49
end
being representative. The game has two player A and B. The state vector in perspective of player
A is s1 = [sA, sB] and in player B s2 = [sB, sA], in accordance with the self-play setting described
above. The game description is given in Sec. H.5. The player was trained while competing with
itself using Alg. 5. Fig. 7a below show the interaction plot for CoPG agents trained with self-play
with both players winning almost 50% of the games. On competing agents trained under self-play
(CoPG-SP) against agents trained with two different networks (CoPG), we observe that self-play
had slight edge in number of game wins. The is probably due to better generalisation of agents
in self-play obtained by exploiting symmetricity in the game. We also trained a GDA agent using
self-play and saw no clear improvements compared to normal GDA as tested in Sec. H.5.
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Figure 7: a-b) Interaction plots, representing probability of seizing ball in the game between A vs B.
X-axis convention, for player A. A1: A scored goal, A2: A scored goal after seizing ball from B, A3:
A scored goal by seizing ball from B which took the ball from A and so forth. Vice versa for player
B. N: No one scored goal both kept on seizing ball. c) probability of games won.
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F Trust region competitive policy optimisation
Following our discussion in the Sec. 3.2 on trust region competitive policy optimization, in this section
we will go into more details on constraint competitive optimization and formally derive and proof all
our results presented in Sec. 3.2. More precisely in this section we first proof Lem. 1 and Thm. 2,
second we will derive how we can efficiently approximate Eq. 12 using a bilinear approximation of
the objective and a second order approximation of the KL divergence constraint and how this allows
us to efficiently find an approximate solution.
F.1 Proof for Lem. 1
Proof. The second term on the RHS of Eq. 9 can be simplified as,
Eτ∼f(.;θ′1,θ′2)
[|τ |−1∑
k=0
γkA(sk, a
1
k, a
2
k; θ
1, θ2)
]
= Eτ∼f(.;θ′1,θ′2)
[|τ |−1∑
k=0
γk
(
Q(sk, a
1
k, a
2
k; θ
1, θ2)− V (sk; θ1, θ2)
)]
= Eτ∼f(.;θ′1,θ′2)
[|τ |−1∑
k=0
γk
(
r(sk, a
1
k, a
2
k) + γV (sk+1; θ
1, θ2)− V (sk; θ1, θ2)
)]
= Eτ∼f(.;θ′1,θ′2)
[|τ |−1∑
k=0
γkr(sk, a
1
k, a
2
k) + γ
k+1V (sk+1; θ
1, θ2)− γkV (sk; θ1, θ2)
]
= Eτ∼f(.;θ′1,θ′2)
[|τ |−1∑
k=0
γkr(sk, a
1
k, a
2
k)
]
− Es0
[
V 1(s0; θ
1, θ2)
]
= η(θ′1, θ′2)− η(θ1, θ2). (50)
This concludes our proof that,
η(θ′1, θ′2) = η(θ1, θ2) + Eτ∼f(·;θ′1,θ′2)
∑|τ |−1
k=0
γkA(s, a1, a2; θ1, θ2).
F.2 Proof for Thm. 2
Proof. Let θ1, θ2 be the parametrization of the policies, when these parameters are updated to
θ′1, θ′2, by Lem. 1 we know that the improved game objective η(θ′1, θ′2) is,
η(θ′1, θ′2) = η(θ1, θ2) + Eτ∼f(.;θ′1,θ′2)
|τ |−1∑
k
γkA(sk, a
1
k, a
2
k; θ
1, θ2). (51)
Furthermore, we defined Lθ1,θ2(θ′1, θ′2) which denotes the surrogate game objective where the
trajectory depends on policies (θ1, θ2) but actions are sampled from (θ′1, θ′2).
Lθ1,θ2(θ
′1, θ′2)=η(θ1, θ2)+Eτ∼f(·;θ1,θ2)
|τ |−1∑
k=0
γkEπ(a′1k |sk;θ′1),π(a′2k |sk;θ′2)A(sk, a
′1
k , a
′2
k ; θ
1, θ2). (52)
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Note that Lθ1,θ2(θ′1, θ′2) is an approximation of true game objective η(θ′1, θ′2). Using the average
advantage function,
A(s; θ1, θ2) =
∑
a1,a2
π(a1|s; θ′1)π(a2|s; θ′2)A(s, a1, a2; θ1, θ2), (53)
one can write Eq. 51 and Eq. 52 as,
η(θ′1, θ′2)− η(θ1, θ2) = Eτ∼f(.;θ′1,θ′2)
[|τ |−1∑
k=0
γkA(s; θ1, θ2)
]
, (54)
Lθ1,θ2(θ
′1, θ′2)− η(θ1, θ2) = Eτ∼f(.;θ1,θ2)
[|τ |−1∑
k=0
γkA(s; θ1, θ2)
]
. (55)
To finish our proof, we subtract Eq. 55 from Eq. 54 and take the absolute value, this allows to bound
|η(θ′1, θ′2)−Lθ1,θ2(θ′1, θ′2)|. To derive this bound let ε = maxs
∑|τ |−1
k γ
kA(s; θ1, θ2), which allows us
to perform the following steps,
|η(θ′1, θ′2)−Lθ1,θ2(θ′1, θ′2)|=
∣∣∣Eτ∼f(.;θ′1,θ′2)[|τ |−1∑
k
γkA(s; θ1, θ2)
]
−Eτ∼f(.;θ1,θ2)
[|τ |−1∑
k
γkA(s; θ1, θ2)
]∣∣∣
=
∫
τ
∣∣∣f(τ ; θ′1, θ′2)− f(τ ; θ1, θ2)∣∣∣[|τ |−1∑
k
γkA(s; θ1, θ2)
]
dτ
≤ εDTV
(
τ ∼ (θ1, θ2), τ ∼ (θ′1, θ′2)
)
≤ ε
√
1
2
DKL(τ ∼ (θ1, θ2), τ ∼ (θ′1, θ′2))
= ε/
√
2
√
DKL((θ′1, θ′2), (θ1, θ2)).
This concludes our proof.
F.3 Constraint Competitive Optimization of a Trust Region
In this section, we approach the constrained optimization problem of TRCoPO given by Eq. 12 in 3
steps. First, motivated by CGD we seek for a Nash equilibrium of the bilinear approximation of the
game objective. Secondly, in contrast to CoPG, where an L2 penalty term is used along with the
bilinear approximation denoting limited confidence in parameter deviation, here a KL divergence
constraint will influence the gradient direction. Note that we incorporate this KL divergence
constraint into the objective using the method of Lagrange multipliers. This results in the game
theoretic update rule defined in Eq. 56.
θ1 ← θ1+ arg max
∆θ1;∆θ1+θ1∈Θ1
∆θ1
>
Dθ1L+∆θ
1>Dθ1θ2L∆θ
2−λ
2
(∆θ1
>
A11∆θ
1+∆θ2
>
A22∆θ
2−2δ′),
θ2 ← θ2+ arg min
∆θ2;∆θ2+θ2∈Θ2
∆θ2
>
Dθ2L+∆θ
2>Dθ2θ1L∆θ
1+
λ
2
(∆θ1
>
A11∆θ
1+∆θ2
>
A22∆θ
2−2δ′). (56)
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Here, λ is the Lagrange multiplier. Note that the same λ is used for both the agents and
that we use a quadratic approximation of the KL divergence, which is DKL
(
(θ1, θ2), (θ′1, θ′2)
)
≈
1
2
∑2
i
∑2
j ∆θ
i>Aij∆θ
j , where Aij = DθiθjDKL
(
(θ1, θ2), (θ′1, θ′2)
)
, and it holds that for i 6= j, Aij = 0.
Note that we will go into more details later on the approximation of the KL divergence.
TRCoPO update: As said the update step in Eq. 56 is given by the Nash equilibrium of the
game within Eq. 56. We can find the Nash equilibrium that fulfills the approximated KL divergence
constraint efficiently by solving the following equation using a line-search approach,
∆θ = −(B + λA′)−1C, subject to:∆θ>A∆θ ≤ δ, (57)
where, let A′, B, C, δ, and ∆θ be defined as,
A′ =
[
−A11 0
0 A22
]
, B =
[
0 Dθ1θ2L
Dθ2θ1L 0
]
,
C =
[
Dθ1L
Dθ2L
]
, δ = 2δ′, and ∆θ =
[
∆θ1
∆θ2
]
. (58)
TRCoPO constraint optimization: After this quick introduction on how to practically
update the policy parameters using TRCoPO, let us derive in detail how to get to Eq. 57. As
explained above Eq. 57 is the Nash equilibrium of an approximation of Eq. 12. Before starting to
approximate Eq. 12 let us rewrite it by using the definition of Lθ1,θ2(θ′1, θ′2) as given in Eq. 52. Note
that we can neglect the constant term η(θ1, θ2), which results in the following game,
max
θ′1
min
θ′2
Eτ∼f(·;θ1,θ2)
|τ |−1∑
k=0
γkEπ(a′1k |sk;θ′1),π(a′2k |sk;θ′2)A(sk, a
′1
k , a
′2
k ; θ
1, θ2), (59)
subject to: DKL((θ1, θ2), (θ′1, θ′2)) ≤ δ′.
Furthermore, we can use an importance sampling factor instead of considering the expected value
with respect to the policies parametrized with (θ′1, θ′2). This results in the following optimization
problem,
max
θ′1
min
θ′2
Eτ∼f(·;θ1,θ2)
|τ |−1∑
k=0
γk
π(a1k|sk; θ′1)π(a2k|sk; θ′2)
π(a1k|sk; θ1)π(a2k|sk; θ2)
A(sk, a
1
k, a
2
k; θ
1, θ2), (60)
subject to: DKL((θ1, θ2), (θ′1, θ′2)) ≤ δ′.
For the game in Eq. 60 we can compute the gradient DθiL and bilinear term DθiθjL given player
i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j as
DθiL = Eτ∼f(·;θ1,θ2)
|τ |−1∑
k=0
γk
Dθiπ(a
i
k|sk; θi)
π(aik|sk; θi)
A(sk, a
1
k, a
2
k; θ
1, θ2),
DθiθjL = Eτ∼f(·;θ1,θ2)
|τ |−1∑
k=0
γk
Dθiπ(a
i
k|sk; θi)Dθjπ(a
j
k|sk; θ
j)
π(aik|sk; θi)π(a
j
k|sk; θj)
A(sk, a
1
k, a
2
k; θ
1, θ2), (61)
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which allows us to formulate the following bilinear approximation of the optimization problem,
max
∆θ1;∆θ1+θ1∈Θ1
min
∆θ2;∆θ2+θ2∈Θ2
∆θ1
>
Dθ1L+ ∆θ
1>Dθ1θ2L∆θ
2 + ∆θ2
>
Dθ2L+ ∆θ
2>Dθ2θ1L∆θ
1,
subject to: DKL((θ1, θ2), (θ′1, θ′2)) ≤ δ′.
However, to efficiently solve the optimization problem we also need to approximate the KL
divergence for the two agent case, similar to Schulman et al. [2015] we use a quadratic approximation
of the constraint.
Approximation of KL divergence Let us derive an approximation of the KL divergence for
the two player case that can be estimated efficiently using Monte Carlo samples. As defined in
Sec. 3.2, the KL divergence between (θ1, θ2) and (θ′1, θ′2) is given by,
DKL
(
(θ1, θ2), (θ′1, θ′2)
)
=
∫
τ
f(τ ; θ1, θ2) log
(
f(τ ; θ1, θ2)
f(τ ; θ′1, θ′2)
)
dτ, (62)
Let us define θ =
(
θ1
>
, θ2
>)>, and ∆θ = θ′ − θ, thus, using a Taylor series to approximate DKL
around θ we get,
DKL(θ, θ
′) = DKL(θ, θ
′)
∣∣∣
θ′=θ
+
∂DKL(θ, θ
′)
∂θ′
∣∣∣∣
θ′=θ
∆θ +
1
2
∆θ>A
∣∣
θ′=θ
∆θ + ε
(
||∆θ||3
)
, (63)
where,
A =
[
Dθ′1θ′1DKL
(
(θ1, θ2), (θ′1, θ′2)
)
Dθ′1θ′2DKL
(
(θ1, θ2), (θ′1, θ′2)
)
Dθ′2θ′1DKL
(
(θ1, θ2), (θ′1, θ′2)
)
Dθ′2θ′2DKL
(
(θ1, θ2), (θ′1, θ′2)
)] . (64)
In the Taylor expansion Eq. 63, the zero order term DKL(θ, θ′)|θ′=θ = 0 and the first order term can
be expanded as,
∂DKL(θ, θ
′)
∂θ′
∣∣∣∣
θ′=θ
=
(
Dθ′1DKL
(
(θ1, θ2), (θ′1, θ′2)
)>
, Dθ′2DKL
(
(θ1, θ2), (θ′1, θ′2)
)>)>∣∣∣∣
(θ′1,θ′2)=(θ1,θ2)
.
When solving for Dθ′1DKL
(
(θ1, θ2), (θ′1, θ′2)
)
, we get,
Dθ′1DKL
(
(θ1, θ2), (θ′1, θ′2)
)∣∣∣
θ′=θ
= Dθ′1
(∫
τ
f(τ ; θ1, θ2) log
( f(τ ; θ1, θ2)
f(τ ; θ′1, θ′2)
)
dτ
)∣∣∣∣
(θ′1,θ′2)=(θ1,θ2)
=
∫
τ
Dθ′1
(
f(τ ;θ1, θ2)logf(τ ;θ1, θ2)−f(τ ;θ1, θ2)logf(τ ;θ′1, θ′2)
)
dτ
=
∫
τ
− f(τ ; θ
1, θ2)
f(τ ; θ′1, θ′2)
Dθ′1f(τ ; θ
′1, θ′2)dτ
∣∣∣∣
(θ′1,θ′2)=(θ1,θ2)
(65)
= −Dθ′1
(∫
τ
f(τ ; θ′1, θ′2)dτ
)
= −Dθ′1(1) = 0.
Similarly, Dθ′2DKL
(
(θ1, θ2), (θ′1, θ′2)
)
= 0. Hence, we write that,
∂DKL(θ, θ
′)
∂θ′
∣∣∣
θ′=θ
= 0.
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Ignoring higher order terms in the approximation, we get
DKL
(
(θ1, θ2), (θ′1, θ′2)
)
≈ 1
2
[
∆θ1 ∆θ2
] [A11 A12
A21 A22
] [
∆θ1
∆θ2
]
, (66)
where, Aij is defined in Eq. 64. Let us now derive all the Aij terms, starting with A11,
A11 = Dθ′1θ′1
(∫
τ
f(τ ; θ1, θ2) log
(
f(τ ; θ1, θ2)
f(τ ; θ′1, θ′2)
)
dτ
)
=
∫
τ
Dθ′1θ′1
(
f(τ ; θ1, θ2) log f(τ ; θ1, θ2)− f(τ ; θ1, θ2) log f(τ ; θ′1, θ′2)
)
dτ (67)
=
∫
τ
Dθ′1θ′1
(
−f(τ ; θ1, θ2) log f(τ ; θ′1, θ′2)
)
dτ
= −
∫
τ
f(τ ; θ1, θ2)Dθ′1θ′1 log(f(τ ; θ
′1, θ′2))dτ,
and now using the definition of f(τ ; θ1, θ2) in Eq. 1, we get,
A11 = −
∫
τ
f(τ ; θ1, θ2)Dθ′1θ′1
(
log
(
p(s0)
|τ |−1∏
k=0
π(a1k|sk; θ′1)
π(a2k|sk; θ′2)R(rk|sk, a1k, a2k)T (sk+1|sk, a1k, a2k)
))
dτ
= −
∫
τ
f(τ ; θ1, θ2)Dθ′1θ′1
(|τ |−1∑
k
log π(a1k|sk; θ′1) + log π(a2k|sk; θ′2)
)
dτ (68)
= −
∫
τ
f(τ ; θ1, θ2)Dθ′1θ′1
(|τ |−1∑
k
log π(a1k|sk; θ′1)
)
dτ.
This formulation allows us to estimate A11 using Monte Carlo samples. Note that an interesting
alternative to estimate A11 only using first order derivatives is in terms of the Fisher matrix. Using
Eq. 67, we get,
A11 =
∫
τ
Dθ′1
(
−f(τ ; θ1, θ2)Dθ′1 log(f(τ ; θ′1, θ′2))
)
dτ
=
∫
τ
Dθ′1
(
− f(τ ; θ
1, θ2)
f(τ ; θ′1, θ′2)
Dθ′1f(τ ; θ
′1, θ′2)
)
dτ
=
∫
τ
− f(τ ; θ
1, θ2)
f(τ ; θ′1, θ′2)
Dθ′1θ′1f(τ ; θ
′1, θ′2)
+
f(τ ; θ1, θ2)
f(τ ; θ′1, θ′2)2
Dθ′1f(τ ; θ
′1, θ′2)Dθ′1f(τ ; θ
′1, θ′2)>dτ.
Similar to Eq. 65, using the above equation we can write A11 at θ′1 = θ1, θ′2 = θ2 as,
A11
∣∣∣
θ′=θ
=
∫
τ
f(τ ; θ1, θ2)
Dθ′1f(τ ; θ
′1, θ′2)
f(τ ; θ′1, θ′2)
Dθ′1f(τ ; θ
′1, θ′2)
f(τ ; θ′1, θ′2)
>
dτ
= Ef(τ ;θ1,θ2)
[
Dθ1 log(f(τ ; θ
′1, θ′2))Dθ1 log(f(τ ; θ
′1, θ′2))>
]
.
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Which by definition is the Fisher information matrix. Using the definition of f(τ ; θ1, θ2) in Eq. 1
and further reformulations, we get the following estimate for A11,
A11
∣∣∣
θ′=θ
= Ef(τ ;θ1,θ2)
[
Dθ1
|τ |−1∑
t
(
log(π(a1t+1|sk; θ′1))
)
Dθ1
|τ |−1∑
t
(
log(π(a1t+1|sk; θ′1))>
)]
.
Note that for our implementation, we use the first approach Eq. 68, but the second approach has the
advantage that it avoids second order derivatives, which can potentially improve computation times.
Using the same ideas as in the derivation of A11 in Eq. 68, we can find the A22 term, which is
A22 = −
∫
τ
f(τ ; θ1, θ2)Dθ′2θ′2
(|τ |−1∑
k
log π(a2k|sk; θ′2)
)
dτ .
Next, in order to estimate the Hessian of the KL divergence, we want to derive a formulation for
A12. Similar to Eq. 68, A12 can be written as,
A12 = −
∫
τ
f(τ ; θ1, θ2)Dθ′1θ′2
(|τ |−1∑
t
log π(a1t+1|sk; θ′1) + log π(a2t+1|sk; θ′2)
)
dτ
= −
∫
τ
f(τ ; θ1, θ2)
(
Dθ′1θ′2
|τ |−1∑
t
(
log π(a1t+1|sk; θ′1)
)
+Dθ′1θ′2
|τ |−1∑
t
(
log π(a2t+1|sk; θ′2)
))
dτ
= 0 + 0
= 0.
Using the same derivation we also get A21 = 0.
Thus, the constraint on the KL divergence DKL((θ1, θ2), (θ′1, θ′2)) ≤ δ′ can be approximated by
the following quadratic inequality constraint,
∆θ1
>
A11∆θ
1 + ∆θ2
>
A22∆θ
2 ≤ 2δ′, (69)
which allows us to efficiently find an approximate solution for Eq. 12.
Derivation of the TRCoPO Update: Given the bilinear approximation of the objective
Eq. 61 and the quadratic approximation of the KL divergence constraint Eq. 69, we can use the the
method of Lagrange multiplier to reformulate the problem as the following optimization problem:
max
∆θ1;∆θ1+θ1∈Θ1
∆θ1
>
Dθ1L+ ∆θ
1>Dθ1θ2L∆θ
2 − λ
2
(∆θ1
>
A11∆θ
1 + ∆θ2
>
A22∆θ
2 − 2δ′),
min
∆θ2;∆θ2+θ2∈Θ2
∆θ2
>
Dθ2L+ ∆θ
2>Dθ2θ1L∆θ
1 +
λ
2
(∆θ1
>
A11∆θ
1 + ∆θ2
>
A22∆θ
2 − 2δ′). (70)
Note that in Eq. 56 the same game was used, and thus finding a Nash equilibrium (∆θ1,∗,∆θ2,∗) to
Eq. 70 allows to define the update rule as (θ′1, θ′2) = (θ1, θ2) + (∆θ1,∗,∆θ2,∗). The Nash equilibrium
(∆θ1,∗,∆θ2,∗) of the game, for a fixed λ, can be obtained by differentiating Eq. 70 with respect to
θ′1, θ′2 and setting the derivatives to zero:
Dθ1L+Dθ1θ2L∆θ
2 − λ(A11∆θ1) = 0,
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Dθ2L+Dθ2θ1L∆θ
1 + λ(A22∆θ
2) = 0. (71)
To solve this system of equations, we can formulate Eq. 71 in matrix form, using ∆θ = [∆θ1>,∆θ2>]>
and δ = 2δ′, which results in[
Dθ1L
Dθ2L
]
+
[
0 Dθ1θ2L
Dθ2θ1L 0
]
∆θ + λ
[
−A11 0
0 A22
]
∆θ = 0 .
This gives us a one dimensional manifold of solutions for ∆θ when varying λ. Using the notation in
Eq. 58, we can reformulate the system of equation as,
C + B∆θ + λA′∆θ = 0,
which for non-singular B + λA′ has the following solution,
∆θ = −(B + λA′)−1 C
For any λ, in case of a unique solution, we obtain a point ∆θ. In the end we are interested in a ∆θ
solution that satisfies the approximate KL divergence constraint Eq. 69 or in other words,
∆θ1
>
A11∆θ
1 + ∆θ2
>
A22∆θ
2 ≤ 2δ′
All λ which satisfy this constraint are legitimate solutions, but we prefer the one which assigns
higher value to the left hand side of this equation. Therefore, considering 1λ as step size, we select a
λ that satisfy this constraint with a high value for the left hand side using line search. The solution
is given by computing ∆θ = −(B + λA′)−1C inside a line search, and choosing the solution that
satisfies the following constraint with the biggest margin,
C>(B + λA′)−1
>
A(B + λA′)−1C ≤ δ.
This concludes our derivation.
G Implementation of algorithms
In this section we talk about final setup of CoPG and TRCoPO algorithms and their efficient
implementation.
G.1 Competitive Policy Gradient
Based on our discussion in Sec. D we propose Alg. 6 which is an extension of Alg. 2 to utilise
advantage function estimation. In this algorithm, simultaneous update of (θ1, θ2) using Eq. 6
requires computing inverse matrix product twice, one for each agent. Instead we can compute
infinite recursion strategy using Eq. 6 for one player only and apply the counter strategy for the
other player as proposed in Schäfer and Anandkumar [2019]. From Eq. 6, for player 1 ∆θ1 =
α
(
Id+ α2Dθ1θ2ηDθ2θ1η
)−1(
Dθ1η − αDθ1θ2ηDθ2η
)
. Using this, one can derive an optimal counter
strategy ∆θ2 for player 2 by solving the arg min in Eq. 5. This results in,
∆θ2 = −α
(
Dθ2θ1η∆θ
1 +Dθ2η
)
,
40
Algorithm 6: Competitive Policy Gradient
Input: π(.|.; θ1), π(.|.; θ2), Vφ(s), N, B, α, Choice of A(s, a1, a2; θ1, θ2) mentioned in Sec 3.1
for epoch : e = 1 to N do
for batch : b = 1 to B do
for k = 0 to |τ | − 1 do
Sample a1k ∼ π(a1k|sk; θ1), a2k ∼ π(a2k|sk; θ2).
Execute actions ak = (a1k, a
2
k)
Record {sk, a1k, a2k, r1k, r2k} in τb
end
Record τb in M
end
1. Estimate A(s, a1, a2; θ1, θ2) with τ in M
2. Estimate Dθ1η, Dθ2η, Dθ2θ1η, Dθ1θ2η using Thm. 1
3. Simultaneously update (θ1, θ2) using Eq. 6
end
which is computed without evaluating an inverse. Similarly, if one evaluates ∆θ2 from Eq. 6, the
optimal counter strategy ∆θ1 can be obtain by solving the arg max in Eq. 5, which is given by,
∆θ1 = α
(
Dθ1θ2η∆θ
2 +Dθ1η
)
.
This reduces the requirement of computing inverse to only once per epoch. Further, CoPG has been
extended to utilise RMSProp to iteratively adapt the step size as proposed in Schäfer et al. [2019].
In RMSProp, the learning rate is adapted based on the moving average of the square of gradients.
The code for CoPG along with RMS Prop is also available in the code repository.
G.2 Trust Region Competitive Policy Optimization
Based on our discussion in Sec. F.3, we propose the trust region competitive policy optimization
algorithm given in Alg. 7.
In the experiments, we used Eq. 68 to estimate A′. As given in the Alg. 7, 3., we suggest to
fulfill the constraint using a line search method. Start with small a value of λ = λ0, and solve for
∆θ = −(B + λA′)−1C. Check for ∆θTA∆θ < δ. If not satisfied change λ to 2λ and repeat it until
the constraint is satisfied.
There could be multiple heuristics to initialize the λ value for a fast convergence. We propose
to solve for λ0 assuming 2 agents solve for their objective independently (TRGDA). The λ value
can be obtained in closed form using single-agent TRPO [Schulman et al., 2015]. Let us say we
obtain λmin and λmax corresponding to the minimizing and maximizing player. We propose to use
λ0 = min{λmin, λmax} as an initialisation.
Similar to single-agent TRPO, often the resulting step size from the algorithm might be large
and thus probably does not benefit either of the agents with policy updates. During such cases, we
can further refine the line search iteratively for a smaller step size and update the policies only if
both players gain an advantage.
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Algorithm 7: Trust Region Competitive Policy Optimisation
Input: π(.|.; θ1), π(.|.; θ2), N, B, δ, Choice of A(s, a1, a2; θ1, θ2) mentioned in Sec 3.1
for epoch : e = 1 to N do
for batch : b = 1 to B do
for k = 0 to |τ | − 1 do
Sample a1k ∼ π(a1k|sk; θ1), a2k ∼ π(a2k|sk; θ2).
Execute actions ak = (a1k, a
2
k)
Record {sk, a1k, a2k, r1k, r2k} in τb
end
Record τb in M
end
1. Estimate A(s, a1, a2; θ1, θ2) with τ in M
2. Estimate Dθ1L, Dθ1L, D2θ1θ2L D
2
θ2θ1L using Eq. 61
3. Solve for ∆θ = [∆θ1>,∆θ2>]> in Eq. 57 using line search,
while ∆θ>A∆θ < δ do
λ←− 2λ
∆θ ←− −(B + λA′)−1C
end
θ ←− θ + ∆θ
end
H Experiment details
In this section, we provide all the details and explanations of the experiment platforms used in this
work. First, we start with the games with a known closed-form Nash equilibrium. Later we talk
about the Markov Soccer game and the car racing game.
H.1 Linear Quadratic (LQ) Game
The zero sum LQ game is defined by:
J(K1,K2) = max
K1
min
K2
E
[ |τ |∑
k=0
γk
(
sk
TQsk + a
1
k
T
R11a
1
k + a
2
k
T
R22a
2
k
)]
, (72)
where: sk+1 = Ask +B1a1k +B2a
2
k, a
1
k+1 = −K1sk, a2k+1 = −K2sk,
where, sk ∈ Rn is the system state vector, a1 ∈ Rd1 and a2 ∈ Rd2 are the control inputs of player
1 and 2 respectively. The matrix A ∈ Rn×n, B1 ∈ Rn×d1 and B1 ∈ Rn×d2 describe the system
dynamics. Here, K1 and K2 denotes the control policies. We considered a simple game where,
A = 0.9, B1 = 0.8, B2 = 1.5, R11 = 1, R22 = 1. These environment parameters are not known to
the players. The policy of each player is linear in the state and actions are sampled from Gaussian
distribution a1 ∼ N (µ1, σ1), a2 ∼ N (µ2, σ2), with initial values µ10 = 0.1 and µ20 = −0.1 and
log(σ10) = log(σ
2
0) = 0.1. The game dynamics and rewards follows Eq. 72. We collected a batch of
1000 trajectories, each 5 time steps long. The optimal control policy (K1∗,K2∗ = −0.5735,−0.3059),
obtained using coupled riccatti equations [Zhang et al., 2019]. The experiment is performed for 5
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different random seeds. As per discussion in Apx. D, we used GAE for advantage estimation with
λ = 0.95 and γ = 0.99. Fig. 8 shows the difference in game objective due to policy update from
(θ1, θ2) to (θ′1, θ′2) given by η(θ1, θ2)− η(θ1, θ2) = Eτ∼f(·;θ′1,θ′2)
∑|τ |−1
k=0 γ
kA(s, a1, a2; θ1, θ2) of GDA
and CoPG for different learning rates. The number of iterations it takes to converge for different
learning rates is given in Table 2.
learning rate 0.1 0.05 0.01 0.005 0.001 0.0001
GDA   113 139 223 611
CoPG 75 87 105 127 195 590
Table 2: Number of iterations to converge to optimal policies
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Figure 8: Difference in game objective due to policy updates for LQ game at different learning rates
H.2 Bilinear game
In a bilinear game both players play actions simultaneously and receive rewards based on the product
of their actions,
r1(a1, a2) = a1a2, r2(a1, a2) = −a1a2, (73)
where a1 ∼ N (µ1, σ1) and a2 ∼ N (µ2, σ2) are actions of player 1 and player 2 respectively. In our
experimental setup, a player’s policy is modelled as a Gaussian distribution with µi, σi, i ∈ {1, 2}
as mean and variance respectively. The policy is randomly initialised. We collected batch of 1000
trajectories. The experiment was performed for learning rates between 0.5 and 0.05 for 8 random
seeds. The main paper features results of CoPG vs GDA, but even for the trust region approach
we observe a similar contrast between TRCoPO and TRGDA. Starting from some random policy
initialization, TRCoPO converges to the unique Nash equilibrium of the game whereas TRGDA
diverges for all δ. Fig. 9 shows such behavior for δ of 0.001.
H.3 Matching pennies
The matching pennies game is played between two players, each player holds a coin and hence has
two possible actions {Head, Tail}. Both the players secretly turn their coin to either head or tail. If
the pennies of both the players matches then player 1 wins and player 2 looses. Otherwise, if pennies
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Figure 9: Policy trajectories of player 1 in a bilinear game. (a) TRGDA (b) TRCoPO
H T
H 1,-1 -1,1
T -1,1 1,-1
Table 3: Game matrix for matching pennies game
do not match then player 2 wins and player 1 loses. The game matrix is given in Tab. 3 captures
win and lose of players for every possible action pair.
Players’ policy is modeled with a two-class categorical distribution, which is randomly initialized.
They sample actions from a softmax probability function over the categorical distribution and receive
rewards for their actions according to the game matrix. We collect a batch of 1000 trajectories,
to estimate gradient and bilinear terms in every epoch. CoPG converges to the Nash equilibrium
of the game (H,T ) =
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
. The experiment was performed for learning rates between 0.5 and
0.05 for 8 random seeds. The main paper features plot of CoPG vs GDA, but even for trust region
approach we observe a similar contrast between TRCoPO and TRGDA. Starting from random policy
initialization, TRCoPO converges to the unique Nash equilibrium of the game (H,T ) =
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
,
whereas TRGDA diverges for all KL-divergence bounds δ. Fig. 10 shows this behaviour for a δ of
0.01. This experiment was performed also performed for 8 different random seeds and the results
where consistent.
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Figure 10: Policy trajectory in matching pennies game
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H.4 Rock paper scissors
The rock paper scissors game is played between two players, each player has three possible actions
{Rock, Paper, Scissors}. Both players will simultaneously display one of three actions: a rock, a
paper, or a scissors. Rock beats scissors, scissors beat paper by cutting it, and paper beats rock by
covering it. This is captured in the game matrix given by Tab. 4. Players’ policies are modeled with
Rock Paper Scissors
Rock 0,0 -1,1 1,-1
Paper 1,-1 0,0 -1,1
Scissors -1,1 1,-1 0,0
Table 4: Game matrix for rock paper scissors game
3 class categorical distribution which is randomly initialized. Players sample action from a softmax
probability function over categorical distribution. They receive a reward for their actions according
to the game matrix. We collect a batch of 1000 trajectories. CoPG converges to the unique Nash
equilibrium of the game, where probability of playing (R,P, S) = (13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3). The experiment was
performed for learning rates between 0.5 and 0.05 for 8 random seeds where CoPG converged in all
cases and GDA diverged. Similarly for the trust region approach, the TRCoPO agent converges to a
unique Nash equilibrium of the game (R,P, S)=
(
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3
)
, where as TRGDA diverges. Fig. 11 shows
this behavior for δ of 0.001. The experiment was performed for 8 different random seeds.
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Figure 11: Policy trajectory in a rock paper scissors game
H.5 Markov Soccer Game
The soccer game setup is shown in Fig. 4. It is played between two players A and B, both are
randomly initialized in one of the 4x5 grid cells. The ball is also randomly initialised in one of the
4x5 grid cells, this contrast to the previous studies, where one of the players was randomly initialised
with the ball. Players are supposed to pick up the ball and place it in the opponent’s goal. The
players are allowed to move up, down, left, right or stand still. The player without the ball seizes
the ball, if both players move simultaneously to the same grid cell. The game ends if a player scores
a goal or none of them scores within 1000 steps. The winner receives a +1 reward and -1 is awarded
to the losing player, hence the game is formulated as a zero sum game. This game does not have an
optimal deterministic policy. This game depicts heavy interactions, where strategy depends on what
the other player plays. Potentially, a good player can learn defending, dodging and scoring.
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The state vector of a player P with respect to opponent O is sP = [xGO , yGO , xball, yball, xO, yO],
where P,O ∈ {A,B}. GO is goal of the opponent, x, y refers to the relative position from the player
to the subscript, e.g., xO, yO is the relative position to the opponent O. The state vector of the
game used during training is s = [sA, sB], s ∈ R12, it captures the position of each player relative to
the goal, the ball and relative to the opponent. The players’ policy maps state vector of the game
to a categorical distribution with 5 categories using a network with two hidden layers one with 64
and other with 32 neurons. Players sample actions from a softmax probability function over the
categorical distribution. The players were trained using GDA and CoPG. In both the algorithms,
players were trained for roughly 30,000 episodes until the number of wins against any good player
saturates. In each epoch we collected a batch which consists of 10 trajectories. All the parameters
were the same throughout the training for CoPG and GDA. The experiment was tested with 6
different random seeds. We used learning rate of 0.01 and GAE for advantage estimation with λ of
0.95 and γ of 0.99.
Similarly, for the trust region approach the same game setting was used, with a maximum KL
divergence δ of 0.0001. The players were trained with TRCoPO or TRGDA. Both the agents were
trained for 5,000 episodes, each episode denotes a batch update where each batch consists of 10
trajectories. For comparison, we played 10000 games between agents trained using TRCoPO and
with that using TRGDA, in which for 50% of the games TRCoPO was player A and for remaining
TRGDA was player A. TRGDA generates unequal players, on competing with the stronger TRGDA
agent, the TRCoPO agent still won more than 80% games against TRGDA as shown in Fig. 3h.
TRCoPO was able to learn better tactics for snatching the ball and dodging and defending its goal
post. The histogram in Fig. 12, depicts a comparison of GDA, CoPG, TRGDA, and TRCoPO in
the soccer game playing against each other.
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Figure 12: Win probability in soccer game played between GDA, CoPG, TRGDA and TRCoPO
H.6 The Car Racing game
Our final experimental setup is a racing game between two miniature race cars, where the goal is to
finish the one lap race first. This involves both, learning a policy that can control a car at the limit
of handling, as well as strategic interactions with the opposing car. Only if a player has the correct
relative position to the opponent, this player is able to overtake or to block an overtaking. Our
simulation study mimics the experimental platform located at ETH Zurich, which use miniature
autonomous race cars.Following [Liniger et al., 2015] the dynamics of one car is modeled as a
dynamic bicycle model with Pacejka tire models [Bakker et al., 1987]. However, compared to
[Liniger et al., 2015] we formulate the dynamics in curvilinear coordinates Vázquez et al. [2020]
where the position and orientation are represented relative to a reference path. This change in
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coordinates significantly simplifies the definition of our reward, and simplified the policy learning.
The resulting state of a single car is given as z = [ρ, d, µ, Vx, Vy, ψ]T , where ρ is the progress along
a reference path, d is the deviation from a reference path, µ is the local heading with respect to
the reference path, Vx and Vy are the longitudinal and the lateral velocity respectively in car frame
and ψ is the yawrate of the car. The inputs to the car is [D, δ]T , where D ∈ [−1, 1] is duty cycle
input to the electric motor varying from full braking at −1 to full acceleration at 1 and δ ∈ [−1, 1] is
the steering angle. The test track which consists of 13 turns with different curvature can be seen
in Figure 13. For the reference path we used the X-Y path obtained by a laptime optimization
tool Vázquez et al. [2020], note that it is not necessary to use a pre-optimize reference path, but
we saw that it helped the convergence of the algorithm. Finally, to get a discrete time MDP we
discretize the continuous time dynamics using an RK4 integrator with a sampling time of 0.03s.
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Figure 13: Overtaking maneuvers of CoPG agents in
the Car Racing Game. The thick line shows trajectory
when the trailing agent overtook.
To formulate the racing game between two
cars, we first define the state of the game
as the concatenated state of the two players,
s = [z1, z2]. Second we convert the objective
of finishing the race first without an accident
into a zero sum game. Therefore, we define
the following reward function using reward
shaping. First to model our no accident con-
straints we use a freezing mechanism: (i) If
the car is leaving the track we freeze it un-
til the episode ends, (ii) if the cars collide,
the rear car (car with the lower progress ρ)
is stopped for 0.1s, which corresponds to a
penalty of about two car lengths. Note that
this gives an advantage to the car ahead, but
in car racing the following car has to avoid col-
lisions. Furthermore, an episode ends if both
cars are either frozen due to leaving the track
or the first car finished the lap. Finally, to
reward the players receive at every time step
is r(sk, a1k+1, a
2
k+1) = ∆ρcar1 −∆ρcar2 , where
∆ρ = ρk+1 − ρk. This reward encourages the
player to get as far ahead of the of the oppo-
nent player as possible. Note that the reward
is zero sum, and the collision constraints do
only indirectly influence the reward.
For the training we started the players on
the start finish line (ρ = 0) and randomly
assigned d ∈ {0.1,−0.1}. We also limited one
episode to 700 time steps, which is about twice as long as it takes an expert player to finish a lap.
For each policy gradient step we generated a batch of 8 game trajectories, and we run the training
for roughly 20000 epochs until the player consistently finish the lap. This takes roughly 62 hours of
training for a single core CPU. To increase the performance and robustness of learning we adapted
the learning rate with RMS prop for both GDA and CoPG and used a slow learning rate of 5.10−5
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for both players. For our experiments we run 8 different random seeds and report the numbers of
the best seed. As a policy we use a multi-layer perceptron with two hidden layers, each with 128
neurons, we used ReLU activation functions and a Tanh output layer to enforce the input constraints.
GAE is used for advantage estimation with λ of 0.95 and γ of 0.99. The same setting was also
used to compare performance of TRCoPO and TRGDA. The maximum KL divergence δ was set
between 1e-4 to 1e-5 and the training was performed for 8 different random seeds. The statistics of
the experiments are presented in the main part of the paper Sec. 4.
H.7 Comparison with MADDPG and LOLA
Finally, we give more details on our comparison of CoPG with MADDPG and LOLA. We performed
this comparison on the Markov soccer and the racing game. We start with the comparison for the
Markov soccer game. To compare the performance of MADDPG on discrete action spaces (such
as in the Markov soccer game), we used policies that can produce differentiable samples through a
Gumbel-Softmax distribution, similar to [Iqbal and Sha, 2019]. The rest of the experimental setup
was kept as similar as explained in H.5, and we trained both MADDPG and CoPG. Fig. 14a shows
that a policy learned by MADDPG performs similar to that of GDA. But when the MADDPG player
competes against CoPG, the CoPG agent wins 80% of the games. Second we studied LOLA, we
observed that LOLA learns better policies than GDA potentially due to the second level reasoning,
but LOLA still loses 72% of the games when playing against CoPG. Fig. 14 show the number of
games won by CoPG when competing against MADDPG and LOLA.
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Figure 14: Comparison with LOLA and MADDPG on the Markov soccer game
Next we evaluated MADDPG and LOLA in the game of Car Racing, where we kept all the
setting identical to H.6. Fig. 5e show the progress of an MADDPG agent during learning, and we can
see that it performs similar to GDA. The car learns to drive up to 30% of the track, but after that
the agents show oscillatory behaviour in training. We also performed this experiment with LOLA,
but due to the variance in estimating the bilinear term and more importantly the non adaptive
learning rate of LOLA it does not learn to drive around the track.
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